

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES

Journal

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal

APRIL 1953

50¢



**GENERAL VAN FLEET
REPORTS ON THE EIGHTH ARMY**

The AAA Gets the Army's First Electronic-Controlled Gun

The "Skysweeper"—the Army's first completely electronically-controlled artillery piece will spot and track with radar, and automatically aim and fire at enemy aircraft flying at low or medium altitudes.

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
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U. S. ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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COMBAT FORCES

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Vol. 3, No. 9

April, 1953

COVER: To keep it firing, keep it clean. (A Signal Corps photo of a 45th Infantry Division machine gun in Korea.)

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
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AVIATION PROGRESS MARKED—Here at Kitty Hawk, N. C., the aviation world recently paid tribute to the Wright Brothers for their achievement of powered flight

in a heavier-than-air machine in 1903. And among the aviation pioneers taking part was Igor Sikorsky, whose aircraft have made a major contribution to air progress.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH THE FLYING JACK-OF-ALL-TRADES



ROTARY-WINGED PACK TRAIN—Airlift of vital construction materials, key personnel, and survey teams is routine on the Aluminum Company of Canada's vast smelting and power development project in the rugged Kitimat region of British Columbia. In a few hours big Sikorsky S-55s, operated by Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd., can haul loads mule trains would need days to deliver.



EASY DOES IT—A big H-19 Sikorsky carrying wounded men settles gently to the lawn in front of the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, ending a mercy flight which began on the battlefield. Regular transfer of Korea casualties arriving at nine military air terminals in the U. S. direct to service hospitals is planned by the Military Air Transport Service.



"SKY PILOT"—Ministering to the spiritual needs of men at sea is often difficult because of rough seas and the distance between ships in a fleet. But with helicopters such as the Sikorsky HO3S-1 shown above, chaplains can move from ship to ship with ease and come aboard by landing or by rescue winch.



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★ To the Editors . . . ★

Infantry Morale

To the Editors:

The January issue carried three very excellent articles, namely, "Does War Worry You," "What's Wrong With the Infantry," and "What's in a Name," all pointing out places where our combat forces can be improved.

The problem of raising the morale of combat forces and in particular the infantry has brought about the addition of all sorts of trappings to the uniform of the infantryman. This is not, in my opinion, a solution or even a step towards a solution. A short time ago I had the distinct displeasure of viewing three newly trained infantrymen wearing the newly authorized morale solution, namely the scarf. It was worn with the khaki shirt collar folded over the blouse collar, covering all insignia, and looking for all the world like the costume of a "B" movie Continental gigolo. There was nothing in the bearing, nothing about the way the uniform was worn or maintained, nothing about their actions to lead one to think of them as Infantry. Merely a blue cloth around the neck trying to overcome and substitute for a lack of pride. Hanging fourragères and other decorations on the uniform of an individual who has nothing else to carry him along does not make an Infantryman or soldier. Pride in himself, his uniform, his unit and his country will do what the decorations will not do.

Pride can be developed by instilling aggressiveness and self-confidence in the recruit (and I think this term should be revived).

In our training divisions today we present to the new recruit his dress uniform, the division and regimental insignia and decorations which were won with blood and effort and that are held high in the hearts of the men who won them. These, along with socks and underwear! The next night at retreat the recruit can fall out wearing all of these symbols of soldiering without having done a thing to earn the right to wear them. He has no immediate goal during training, except maybe to think about getting out of the service. From that time on, the past accomplishments of any unit he may belong to mean little or nothing, unless special effort is taken, because he has had to do nothing to reap the benefits of such honors.

If the soldier wears his dress uniform for the first time when leaving recruit camp and reporting to his new unit, and if the new unit points with pride to its achievements, its patch, its distinctive insignia, and if the new soldier (this is his title now) is taught these things, he then adds these elements to his uniform and he has greater pride. He is now the member of a distinguished group, both in the

present and historically. Pride again.

That the infantryman should have something distinctive about his uniform is certainly valid. The paratrooper has his wings and boots; the tanker has his hat to wear full and on the left side of his head. Possibly a blue crown to the overseas cap of the Infantry and a greater effort to qualify and award the Expert Infantryman Badge would make the uniform distinctive.

LT. DAVID O. MEEKER, JR.
USAR

6035 N. Olney Street
Indianapolis, Ind.

Dutch Reply

To the Editors:

In his article "People's War" in the December issue, Lieutenant Colonel Edward D. Raymond stated:

"The Indonesians who had never accepted Dutch control, openly resisted Dutch efforts to reoccupy the country at the end of the war and effectively denied a large part of the country to the Dutch military forces. As a result, the Netherlands government granted virtual independence to the area."

Sirs, it is my privilege to assure you, and I do so proudly, that whenever the Dutch military forces were ordered to seize and occupy any "effectively denied large part of the Indonesian country," it never failed to carry out its mission.

Unbelievable as it may seem, we did receive wholehearted cooperation which made it possible to control large parts of the country by platoons and patrols, rather than by strong units.

However, action was restricted, we always had to carry out a small part of limited warfare: no trespassing of superimposed borders. (Did you ever hear of the Yalu River?)

LT. M. E. A. GOBUS
Netherlands Army

34 Lijsterlaan
OSS, Holland

Efficiency Reports

To the Editors:

Many comments and criticisms have been made about Officer Efficiency Reports. Recently the Air Force distributed a memorandum cautioning commanders to use extreme care in preparing them. Most of the criticism is directed at the commander in his appraisal of a subordinate.

In order to get a more accurate evaluation of an officer's performance, I suggest that superior, like and subordinate officers submit reports on fellow officers. In a company, platoon leaders would be rated by the company commander and the other company officers. The company commander would be rated by the battalion commander, other company commanders, and

the platoon leaders. Staff officers in headquarters would be rated by the commander, other staff officers, and subordinate officers dealing directly with that particular staff officer. An officer would be required to make out a minimum of five and a maximum of ten reports on other officers, depending on his position. Conversely, every officer would have five or more ratings submitted on his performance during a given period.

A similar system has been used at Officer Candidate Schools and at the Military Academy. Anyone who has used this system of "buddy lists" admits that it is the best indication of the leadership qualities of the group. Advantages of this method are that by increasing the number of ratings for a given period, the human element is varied and the rating base is widened; every officer would have a small part in the evaluation and betterment of the entire officer corps.

Disadvantages are that a comparatively high number of reports (ten in some cases) must be submitted by some officers and an increase in the work load of the office that evaluates the reports.

The reciprocal method can either replace the present system or it can be used by the Army yearly or periodically as a check against the results submitted under the present system.

LT. F. A. WOLAK

Sandia Base
Albuquerque, N. M.

Little Men and Big Base Plates

To the Editors:

Recent announcement of the development of a new light 81mm mortar is cause for celebration. I can't help remembering the backaches encountered by Fifth Army troopers in lugging the "iron monster" over the mountains of Italy during World War II. Somehow it always seemed that the smallest men in the battalion were assigned to the Heavy Weapons Company (excepting those who fell heir to the rifle company's BARs). And in the weapons company itself there was a further process of separation of the small men from the smaller with the latter traditionally coming to rest as gunner and assistant gunner of the mortar squad.

Many is the time I've climbed a hill behind one of those little men loaded down with a base plate strapped on his back. All that could be seen of him was half a head above and two legs protruding to the ground below. He'd sweat and he'd curse the weight and the cumbersomeness of the thing. But eventually he'd get where he was going and proceed to set up shop.

No need to say I felt sorry for the little guy (and even for the occasional big guy who caught the assignment). But did you ever try to separate one of them from his mortar, to give him a lighter assignment? Impossible!

Since we can't get the little man away from his mortar and more specifically from

MILITARY NEWS from the world's largest light plane producer



FIRST TURBOPROP LIGHTPLANE COMPLETES TEST AT CESSNA

Turbine in L-19 "Bird Dog" eliminates Vibration and Cooling Problems; Operates on almost any kind of fuel.

The Cessna XL-19B, world's first turbine propeller light airplane has successfully passed its initial flight test, the Cessna Aircraft Company announced recently.

The unusual flexibility of a turboprop engine—as revealed in the plane's first flight — provides control characteristics that are far superior, in some cases, to the L-19A, Cessna's combat-proved observation plane.


Advantages of the turbine over conventional engine include simplification of power plant installation, elimination of cooling problems and airborne vibration, plus ability to fly on almost any type of fuel.

Last year, much of Cessna production went to U. S. Armed Forces. Today, in Cessna shops at Wichita, Prospect and Hutchinson, Kansas, military work booms on a variety of new assignments . . .

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
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IN ARMY OBSERVATION PLANES AND TURBOPROP RESEARCH . . .



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his base plate, let's go whole hog and not only develop an improved mortar, but get rid of the old outside base plate, too.

It really isn't difficult. The purpose of the large base plate is to absorb the recoil of the propelling charge from the tube. With new lightweight metal giving us a lighter tube, there is no reason why we can't incorporate the recoil mechanism right into the tube. It could be done by means of a spring contained in a collar locked to the base of the tube. Or if we want to get fancy, we could use a simple hydraulic system to take up the recoil. Either way, the need for a shock-absorbing base plate would be eliminated so that we could probably get away with using one about the size of the present 60mm plate.

CAPT. ALBAN E. REID, JR.
ROTC Instructor Group
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

Board, Plotting, M1A1

To the Editors:

Reference is made to your excellent article on the Observation Battalion in February issue. Proper recognition of this unit is long overdue. Your article will do much to familiarize officers with its capabilities and limitations.

However, you slipped at one point on page 26. The proper name for that equipment is board, plotting M1A1 (for sound ranging).

LT. FLETCHER W. FRALEY
449th FA Obser. Bn
Ft. Bragg, N. C.

The CIB

To the Editors:

I would like to comment on Corporal Gordon L. Scheopp's letter in the February issue.

What he wrote about service troops not being qualified for the Combat Infantryman's Badge is true in most cases. Still, I would like to point out that during the early part of the Korean War, all personnel assigned to divisional units (as well as units of corps and sometimes army) were serving for the most part as riflemen. Since this was the case, I see no reason why the men assigned to infantry units should not have been awarded the CIB if they had seen action in the lines.

If anyone needs proof of the fact that some service personnel did fight as infantrymen, I would like to quote from the official wording of the citation awarding the DUC to the 24th Infantry Division: "Throughout the entire period of this heroic action, officers and men distinguished themselves by conspicuous gallantry and courage. Service troops fought side by side with riflemen . . . in fact every man in the division was engaged in battle."

Because of the facts, I believe those men in infantry units, no matter what their jobs may be, should be awarded the CIB

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



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when, and if, they earn it as riflemen earn theirs. I disagree with the Corporal who says: "Any time the Badge is issued or worn by a driver or cook or clerk it is being disgraced," but I will go a little further and say the Badge should be awarded to any member of an infantry unit in combat who earns it as it was meant to be earned. A man's MOS or job doesn't matter when the chips are down.

EX-19TH INFANTRY

Civilians in Cars

To the Editors:

I do not know if there is an agency in the Army that takes up such matters, but since most military men read the JOURNAL, it is a good place to bring out a point that troubles me.

The bitter and unfortunately steady cry of the taxpayers against the waste and/or abuse of the Army, and in particular the officers, sometimes has a lot of truth in it. But just as often, as we all know, it is unjust. But does anyone take the time to try and run down the source of these attacks? At this post, within the past 60 days, there have appeared in the daily bulletin constant reminders to members of the military establishment about using government transportation for their own personal use. In the fifteen and a half years I have been associated with my chosen profession, I have yet to see an

out-and-out abuse of transportation by any rank. At the same time, I have never ceased to hear the civilian population scream about it. I have made it a point to look into these complaints and now I feel that I have sufficient background material to open my big yap and make a suggestion.

Let's take military vehicles that are to be used or operated by anyone not wearing the uniform and paint them a nice civilian black, and put on the standard U. S. Government license plate.

To back up my suggestion, I am reminded of these things which I have seen—and you too:

The GI sedan I spotted, all complete with well-clad civilians; another doing 60 m.p.h., complete with shirt-tailed civilians, plus female. The many GI sedans to be seen up and down all our highways. I could go on for pages.

I won't deny that many of these civilians may have been on very official missions, but to John Q. Public, those were Army sedans and that is all he cares about. It might cost a little to mark these vehicles distinctively, but then there would be no doubt in the taxpayers' minds as to who was driving what. It would also reduce a lot of false accusations against uniformed men and women.

MAJ. HARRY W. MORSE

The Armored School
Ft. Knox, Ky.

Critic from Spain

To the Editors:

If you will permit some more sideline sniping from Spain, let me comment on one paragraph from the article by Colonel Robert B. Rigg in the January issue. Paragraph seven says, "The Chinese Red Army never militarily licked the mass of Chinese Nationalist armies in the Civil War."

If Colonel Rigg meant "physically" instead of "militarily," why didn't he say so? If he meant "militarily," then he's wrong. Persuading an army to defeat in droves is one of the smartest military victories possible.

Then he goes on to say, "the entire Red Army of China is not a volunteer army." Well, what about it? Neither is the U. S., nor the British, nor the French, nor any other major army.

"Until Korea, it had never faced modern fire power on the ground, in, or from the air." I seem to recollect that the Japanese had modern enough fire power to cause the American Army considerable trouble, and the Chinese faced them.

If we're going to "face up to the facts"—as the head to the article suggests—let's face them presented in straight language. The idea behind Colonel Rigg's article was excellent, and the last paragraph contained the real punch. But most of the article is "fluff."

Let's have some more Hargreaves from time to time. He writes fancy, but good.
LT. RICHTER

Training Reservists

To the Editors:

Seems as if I must sound off periodically. If I don't, I'll flip a lid. It's like voting: if you don't vote, you've got no right to squawk. If you can't suggest something better, or different, at least, you have no right to inflict your opinions out in the open and in front of everyone at the officers' mess bar.

My subject this time is the training being given under the ORCTPs to Army Reserve units. I'm firmly convinced much can be done to improve it, particularly in those units located in the more sparsely settled states. How we envy those unit instructors and military districts close to an army headquarters or in the metropolitan areas with all of their personnel and training aids!

First, it is assumed that the purpose behind the training of the Army Reserve unit is the formation and instruction of a cadre which will serve as a base (or "hard core" as it is now known) and upon which a full unit can be formed. At least this is my conception. Therefore, a cadre strength is assigned a reserve unit made up of the key MOS positions within a unit.

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
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and a man qualified by experience to fill the MOS. All that is necessary is to keep the man abreast of new ideas, give him a chance to brush up his knowledge every so often, and to offer a chance of promotion. No sweat, no strain!

However, for some reason known to only those reservists who were recalled involuntarily, the chance of a unit commander recruiting such an individual is extremely slim. Recruits mainly come from the 17-year-olds, who, while not immune from the draft, nevertheless like the idea of going on active duty as an NCO rather than as a PFC as they would if drafted.

These recruits, being fresh from high school, usually have little or no military experience. Yet, the unit commander, having MOS vacancies in his cadre, must assign them to those vacancies, so you may find, upon inspecting a unit, the approved assignment of a fresh, clear-eyed youngster

to a master sergeant's slot and MOS and wearing the stripes of a private first class. You ask him how long he has been in the unit and he may reply nineteen months or so. His only gripe is that they haven't promoted him to the grade his slot in the cadre calls for as the recruiting officer promised. You ask him what he knows about his responsibilities and duties in his assigned job and he points to his 100 per cent attendance record. He hasn't attended a service school, for his civilian job or schooling forbids them, yet here is a man, a member of a unit for more than a year, present at every meeting, and who, through no fault of his own, has no knowledge of his assigned job. Furthermore, he will be promoted soon, for morale must be maintained. In an emergency he might be ordered to active duty as an individual, or his unit called out, and you would have a soldier wearing the stripes and knowing little or nothing of the duties expected of his grade and MOS.

Turn a page and see what could be.

You have the same recruit. Outfit him and give him his twelve hours of basic instruction under the best noncoms you have. Or better still help him attend basic training at one of the training divisions. Then give him an hour of a general subject suitable to his type unit at his first meeting after basic, by any method other than a lecture. The second hour, place before him the first of a series of subcourses designed to give him theoretical knowledge of his assigned MOS. Tell him that, upon completion of the first subcourse, he'll be promoted his first step up the ladder. Let him study his subcourse on the following evening meetings under the eye of the unit instructor and keep drumming it into him that the speed of his advancement depends entirely on him.

Furthermore, encourage him to take his subcourse home with him.

He completes his first course, receives a test from the unit instructor, completes it satisfactorily, and receives a certificate that he is eligible for promotion. He then hands in his certificate to the unit com-

mander who, provided he also concurs, promotes the recruit. The unit instructor then issues him his second course, telling him that when he completes it, his examination will include a little practical demonstration of his knowledge.

His education proceeds by the subcourse method, but before he receives his "sergeant-first" or "master," he is required to complete a short tour of active duty at a service school suitable to his MOS.

In addition, his field training period during the year is devoted to practical training in his MOS. He is grouped with several others having the same MOS and his group receives on-the-job training under the supervision of a trained instructor.

Granted, it would appear that this setup of training is going back to training by correspondence course, and is directed at the housekeeping MOS rather than the technical ones. Possibly so, but, in a comparison between it and the present methods, this one would appear to go farther towards the original purpose—that of creating a trained cadre. Even if he has been unable to get practical experience, he would be better qualified by reason of theoretical knowledge of what his duties were than if he had no knowledge of them at all.


The cost of preparing subcourses would be considerable, but there would be some return for the expenditure. Furthermore, by enabling a reservist to progress as fast as his own efforts permit him, interest would be created and better morale would result. At least, the difference between a "sergeant-first" on active duty and one on inactive, both with the same MOS, would be less. Also, even though a reservist cook might not be able to make an omelette, at least he would know he must use eggs and a pan.

The need is training in the garden variety of housekeeping MOS for the many men who can't or won't attend Army common-specialist schools.

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
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The Responsibilities of the JCS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives a soldierly explanation of the role of uniformed men in a democracy

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

IT is easy for the armchair strategist to choose a resolute and bold course of action for his country. I know that I have many acquaintances who urge upon me one or several . . . military actions. . . . I know that many people would like to ask at this point: What do the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that we do? What should be our national strategy and national policy in this perplexing situation?

I believe it is important for all of us to understand the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in our national policy-making, because many people believe that during times of stress like these "the military," as we are loosely labelled, have dangerous and undue powers in the influencing of our national policy. Actually, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law and by practice, is a subordinate role, and one which we zealously observe.

I would like to state my own personal views on what recommendations are actually in order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have outlined these views to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and to Congressional committees, and in all quarters they have seemed to meet with general civilian approval.

It is important to remember—and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff we are constantly reminding ourselves—that military policy, and its included strategic planning, is not separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our over-all policy for the safety and security of our nation.

UNDER the National Security Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with several specific duties. Among these is listed "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." We are charged with making strategic plans, and providing for the strategic direction of the military forces of the nation in peace and war.

When the Government is considering the establishment of policy, the President receives recommendations from the Department of State from a foreign policy view. He considers domestic political advice, including guidance from the Congress and existing laws. He studies the economic implications of the specific problem, considers the psychological aspects of the policy, and from the Department of Defense he gets military advice in connection with the proposed policy. The agency with which he discusses all the factors and which assists him in arriving at a decision is the National Security Council.

As the military advisers of the Government, we feel that our job is to take the various courses of action that are suggested in the problem and analyze them from the military viewpoint, telling the President, through the Secretary of Defense, what our capabilities are and as far as we know, what risks are being taken when we pursue either this course or that course.

GENERALLY, however, I do not feel that it is Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility to recommend specifically which course of action the Government should take. We should confine our part to pointing out the military implications and military capabilities. Then, of course, after a decision is reached, we make recommendations on the military action required to carry out such decisions. No matter what the decision becomes, once it is made we do our utmost to carry out the military responsibilities which it involves.

Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a national policy which we would prefer, but to date I have not been convinced that this is the proper role of a military leader. I do not believe that military strategists should choose the course of government action; and I do not believe that we should publicly, or before Congressional committees, fail to support the decisions made by our civilian superiors.

In Congressional hearings we feel free to give our personal opinions and to point out the same capabilities and risks that we had pointed out before any decisions were made—so that the legislators will have as full and complete information as the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of State—but I do not believe that we should go beyond this.

From an address by General Bradley delivered at Palm Beach, Florida, on 2 March 1953.

Report on the Eighth Army

General Van Fleet tells Congressional Committees:

- The U. S. soldier "measures up to anything you ask of him"
- The ROKs "are always surprising you with an exceptional performance"
- The enemy is four-fifths Chinese, one-fifth North Korean

Condensed and edited from the record of the open hearing before the House and Senate Armed Services committees.

U. S. Forces

Q: General Van Fleet, I was interested in your comments about the extension of draft service to 30 or 36 months. How much training would that give them?

Van Fleet: Well, the boy today gets 16 weeks of training in the States, in our replacement-training center. Then, after a short leave home, he is shipped overseas and we, perhaps, get them at the end of, well, between their sixth and ninth month of service, that is, when they arrive in Korea—that is a basic soldier, we will say, a rifleman for an infantry outfit. He is given further training there, unit training, with his outfit, and in due time he fits in and becomes a member of the team.

By the time he may show some potential for a leadership job or a skilled job, he is, of course, recommended, and goes to further schooling in Korea. When he comes back from that, which may last from a month to, oh, three or four months, depending upon the course, he has a short time to do. He still is usually a private or a private first class, and in that short period of one or two months still to do, he may become a corporal, but if he has been there longer he might work up to a sergeant or maybe a sergeant first class. But by the time he gets good, we rotate him home, so we are always short 50 per cent or less of the skills and junior leaders required for a field army.

We do not have them long enough after we get them good to have them give a proper return for the investment we have in them. I would say, let us train them first, and then use them for the period of combat necessary, and send them home and discharge them. The moment they arrive home, we should discharge them.

Q: Could you give us a little more in detail about the morale of our own men?

Van Fleet: I believe our American boys, grown up in an age of world trouble, have heard an awful lot about Communism as it has been debated in the United Nations and seen and read about, and that boy is acquainted with its terrible condition, and he accepts his lot as having to do



GENERAL JAMES A. VAN FLEET


something about it. When he is properly indoctrinated in the Army, he is glad to wear the uniform, and even happy that he becomes a rifleman, very proud of himself as a combat rifleman, a doughboy.

Now, in Korea he does not stay there too long. The rotation is a great morale factor as far as doing his duty and seeing the end of it, to come home and let somebody else do his share, as it should be in a democracy. That is costly to the military to do it that way, but it does spread the hardship around to a larger number, and it does keep him feeling that it is a fair proposition while he is in Korea, and he is willing to do his part.

Q: And he seems to sense the situation more so maybe than we do here?

Van Fleet: He measures up to anything you ask of him.

Q: Since June, 1952, the expiration of the 24-month period when inductions first began, have you had a shortage of men to carry on even the limited mission that you have?



Van Fleet: During most of 1951 we were at full strength and at times over strength. We reached a peak strength of 108 per cent, or 8 per cent over strength, at one time, and that is a very healthy condition to have a little fat. It permits you to operate about at normal strength because there is always somebody on leave, emergency back to the States, on rest and recreation to Japan, or sick in hospital, various causes; you have from 10 to 15 per cent of your men away. So it lets you operate close to a hundred per cent having that extra fat.

We expected that to continue. In fact, we were told many times by visitors from Washington, who were interested in personnel, that they would build it up to a 15 per cent over strength especially during periods when the program of rotation was put into effect, we would have a 15 per cent over strength, so as to permit an overlap in Korea, where the man arriving would be there and broken in before the man he replaced starts home; they built up to 115. Well, instead of building that 15 per cent over, when they put the rotation plan into effect, beginning about the winter of 1951-52, the over strength kept going down instead of up, until we shipped them home before the replacement arrived—that is the situation today—and we have about 89 per cent strength total on paper, but in ranks it is, of course, less than that, due to normal losses.

Of that 89 total strength in the skills and leaders, junior leaders, it is about 50 per cent. In some categories it is as low as 30 per cent. . . .

Q: Do our allies replace their troops—do they keep their replacements up?

Van Fleet: The U. N. units are kept at full strength, and at times many of those battalions are over strength. They have a rotation policy that goes by units more than it does by individuals. For instance, a new battalion will come out from England, and the old battalion in Korea will go home. The same way with some Canadian battalions, the Princess Patricia Regiment.

Q: You do make the statement then that in terms of ammunition and in terms of men that you have not had the supplies or the men to carry out even your limited mission. Is that a fact?

Van Fleet: Yes, sir.

Q: How does our fire power compare to that of the enemy?

Van Fleet: Well, there are three great characteristics of the Eighth Army which we have a complete supremacy in. Those characteristics are quality of troops, fire power of our weapons and mobility or flexibility to meet situations, and only a United States Army combines those three qualities to get maximum good from them.

Q: Would you mind touching briefly upon the morale of the troops? No war was ever popular, of course; this is perhaps one of the most unpopular ones in which we have ever engaged. But we were rather surprised, if not amazed, at the high spirit of morale of the men up at the front.

Van Fleet: It is the mission of any commander to keep his unit fit, ready and willing for battle. If he can't do that, he had better be replaced. Our men are fit. They are continuously being trained to be better so as to be ready for anything that may happen. More than that is the heart that goes into it. They are willing to take their—

Q: But the fact that you are in the stalemate makes it much more difficult for you to maintain a high spirit of morale; does it not?

Van Fleet: The job is greater; yes, sir.

Q: The job is greater. The men are not only willing but eager to go if given a green light?

Van Fleet: That is correct, sir.

Q: Well, what recommendation do you have [in the replacement system]?

Van Fleet: Our replacement system is not satisfactory today . . . [in] numbers and quality.

Q: Numbers and quality. In response to the chairman's question with respect to the readiness of the forces, you said that they were the best-equipped, housed, fed, and so forth, of any American force. I noted that you did not include the best-trained force that America has ever put in the field. Did you omit that quality purposely?

Van Fleet: Yes, I did. An outfit becomes a veteran outfit in its practice in its trade at full scale. The Eighth Army has not been in hard battle for some time. We have endeavored to maintain its efficiency by training in the rear areas and by occupation of a defensive line with an active program of patrols, patrolling. But that is not fighting, to become expert in that very difficult trade.

Q: General, many of the mothers in this country whose sons are sent to Korea have the view that the fact they are in Korea they are under constant danger from the enemy.

Would you comment on the extent of danger of the large numbers of American troops who go to Korea, and what proportion of them are in that danger area?

Van Fleet: Well, we had at one time half of our home divisions in reserve. That cuts it down 50 per cent. Now, of our divisions there, I guess that represents not more than three-fifths of the total who go to the Far East—maybe 50 per cent. Only 50 per cent get into the fighting divisions. So that is a 50 per cent chance. Then 50 per cent of the time they are in there they are in reserve. Then on the front line, half of them are in reserve. One regiment of three is in the reserve, and of the regiment on line, one battalion of it is in support. So it goes on down. So, actually you get down to a small percentage on the front line. . . . The person who carries the burden is usually the man who is getting that combat pay which you authorized. He is in the danger area, being shot at. That is, about 25 per cent qualify.

Q: If you increase the period of training of U. S. troops in the United States, would you correspondingly decrease the period of time the individual would spend in Korea?

Van Fleet: Yes; but I would increase the draft period from 24 to 30 or 36 months. . . . Prepare that American boy for a better chance to live, but not use him any more than we are now doing in battle. His period of time in facing enemy bullets would be the same.

Q: Any increase in the period of training, then, before he is shipped overseas, would entail corresponding increase, say, in his total length of service?

Van Fleet: Yes.

The ROKs

Q: General, there has been a great deal of interest here about the ROK troops. Can you tell us something of their training?

Van Fleet: Of course, in the early days they got no training. They just would go out and gather in thousands of them, and say, "Here is a rifle," and show them how you load and pull the trigger, and he was in ranks in a matter of a few days, and he learned it the hard way in battle. Any emergency would cause any people to do that, of course.

General Ridgway got that training during his regime up to four weeks, but there were only 200 a day being called in, so it was not very many, and on a short four weeks, well, 200 a day, they did not come in on Sunday—well, 200

a day for 25 days that would give us 5,000, only a small pool of 5,000 in that training pipe line.

Well, I stepped that up to 300, then 500, 700, I held it there for a long time, brought the training from 4 weeks to 8 weeks, then 12 weeks, and 14 weeks, then 16 weeks, the same as our replacement-training period, except they worked longer hours and more days, and no week ends.

Last fall I started to go from 900, 1,000 1,100 1,200, so that today there are 1,200, less the losses—I do not know just what that figure is—well, it is around 1,200—coming out 6 days a week or around 25 days a month after 16 weeks of training. Well, that gives us in the pipe line today about 108,000 instead of 5,000—you see how that terrific number has to swell. Of course, in doing that we are always exceeding our authorized ceiling. You get more and are training them longer, that swells the numbers that are not in combat or we will say the—

Q: What do you mean "the authorized ceiling" there, General?

Van Fleet: Well, you have a certain announced figure for logistical support purposes, for planning purposes, for the shipment of food, clothing and general supplies that we feel in Washington here, in the Pentagon, they are able to support, and that is a decision here of policy. The State Department gets into it, I guess, and the Congress and all agencies.

Q: When the war first started we were impressed here with the way the ROK troops gave way and did not support our men on the flanks, and the casualties ran up, but that has all been cleaned up and changed through the process you described?

Van Fleet: Yes, sir. That was very evident during the early days when the man not trained and not with proper weapons could not hold a line against a mass attack. . . . It was not his fault, but he was bitterly criticized even by our own American officers. . . . When you understood that situation, well, nobody could stand under those conditions; a wave will engulf them. But give them training and give them weapons and just reasonable leadership—gosh, how they can fight! . . . They never have disappointed me since they had proper training and weapons, never. They are always surprising you with an exceptional performance.

Q: And this program you have outlined is continuing on with the ROK troops?

Van Fleet: Yes, sir.

Q: And what about the training of the officers? Are they receiving adequate training? I mean the ROK officers—are we getting enough of them?

Van Fleet: We have a very complete training establishment in Korea for Koreans, all the necessary schools for officers, noncommissioned officers and specialists, and a splendid replacement-training system to turn out the trained soldier, who receives the 16 weeks of intensive basic training, even far better than our own boys in America do in those 16 weeks, because he goes through the training camp and he doesn't live there during that period and he trains 10 hours a day, 6 days a week, and on Sunday he washes his clothes and does other things around camp. . . .

We get a well-trained man, well-trained leader, well-trained specialist. I dare say that some of that training and schools are better than we have here in America.

Q: Can we get 10 more divisions out of the ROK personnel, and what would that cost us?

Van Fleet: The man power is there. The cost I do not have available. The equipment itself will cost as much as

equipment for an American division, piece for piece. They don't get the same quantity as we give to an American division. The cost would be a fraction of what it would take, total cost.

Q: The two things that the Republic of Korea soldier needs, are supplies—we have to equip them—and then we do have to furnish leadership and train them until they can take over?

Van Fleet: Yes, sir.

Q: Even if we created 10 additional divisions, General, we could not hope to withdraw our American troops soon. We would have to keep a pretty good-sized force there for some time, don't you think?

Van Fleet: Yes, I am strong in that belief, that Korean divisions can't replace American divisions at this time.

Q: So we don't want to create false hopes among the American people that, even if we build up the South Korean forces, our boys are coming home tomorrow. We are in for a long, hard pull.

Van Fleet: We must not let our people believe that.

Q: General, what is the potential from the standpoint of divisions for the Korean man power?

Van Fleet: They could go up to 20 divisions very readily, and support that number, with heavy casualties.

Q: In addition to the 14 divisions of ROK forces, how many South Koreans are in the American forces? Integrated into the American forces?

Van Fleet: We have a ceiling strength there of 28,000. That provides about three men per squad, which is about as thick as you can put them in and still have an American complexion.

The Enemy

Q: The majority of the Communist forces in Korea at the present time are Chinese?

Van Fleet: Yes.

Q: They constitute by far the larger group?

Van Fleet: Oh, I would say four fifths.

Q: Four fifths. That large?

Van Fleet: Yes, sir.

Q: That [leaves] the North Koreans representing one fifth. Are the North Koreans having any difficulty replacing their casualties?

Van Fleet: The North Koreans reached the bottom of their man power a year ago. We do not find any people that have been brought into the Korean Army in the last —oh, 12, 18 months, except a few who have been hiding out and they finally caught up with them.

Q: Now, who is supplying the North Korean divisions with their matériel of war?

Van Fleet: Russia.

Q: Is it not true that the Chinese now—the Chinese divisions who oppose us on the front—are receiving matériel of war manufactured in China?

Van Fleet: Some matériel they produce themselves; yes, sir. That has been a hodgepodge of matériel in the past, made up of Japanese, Russian, Chinese and American. That has gradually worn out and been replaced in recent months by a big inflow of Russian-manufactured equipment.

Q: Is it not true that in China proper they are duplicating various types of weapons—Japanese, British, German and American weapons, that are now showing up on the front line?

Van Fleet: Yes; they are very good imitators. They copy our weapons very readily.



HEADQUARTERS SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

16 January 1953

Dear Joe:

I am sending you, under separate cover, copies of Training Memorandum No. 45 of this Division. It is the basis for our most realistic training here in Korea. I believe it would make a good article for the Combat Forces Journal.

As background I might explain that many units used different types of battle drill during World War II. The British had the best formalized instruction and we copied some of their methods. I trained my regiment in Italy to use fixed pre-planned squad and platoon maneuvers, and was looking for some such procedures when I arrived in Korea. As no training literature was available I wrote my own. The ideas expressed in it received confirmation when Eighth Army put on a demonstration of small unit maneuvers for all division commanders. I was not surprised that the method demonstrated were almost exactly the same as the methods we were teaching in the 2d Division.

Training Memorandum No. 45 represents the combined thinking of many experienced combat officers now with the 2d Infantry Division. The officer primarily responsible for its preparation is Major John A. Rankin, G3 of the Division, whose vivid imagination and keen mind, supplemented by an outstanding combat record, made this an important piece of training literature in my opinion.

If you publish an article based on this document I am confident that it will be received with enthusiasm by every noncommissioned and junior officer who reads it.

Sincerely,

J. C. FRY
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Colonel Joseph I. Greene
Editor, Combat Forces Journal
1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Battle Drill ►

OUR Army's training methods are constantly being improved and our training literature is constantly refined with lessons from the battlefield. Conscientious efforts have been made by combat leaders of all ranks to have the training experience of men who are to go into battle be as practical and realistic as it possibly can be made.

But young officers and men are still being committed to combat improperly prepared to close with the enemy.

Every young soldier—enlisted or commissioned—approaches his first combat with questions, conscious that something was missing in his training. This uncertainty weakens the command structure of our combat units and detracts from the teamwork that must exist when the infantry closes with the enemy.

Much of the fault lies in the absence of proper psychological pre-conditioning, coupled with the lack of literature and procedures that will teach men what to expect and how to coordinate their efforts when they reach that last violent area of combat where commanders can no longer move about freely to issue orders or to give recognizable signals.

The lack of a clear word-picture of what happens in that last 100 yards of the fight where 99 per cent of all casualties are taken lies in the fact that most of the men who have experienced this phase of combat have been sergeants and privates who accept the saying that battle is the pay-off and that men have to experience combat to know how to conduct themselves wisely. Few of them, therefore, have ever made any effort to describe what takes place or to improve upon training procedures.

There is truth in the statement that battle is the pay-off but there is no reason to believe that existing literature and existing procedures cannot be refined to a degree where men will be better prepared for that last violent phase of combat.

A careful analysis of the reactions of combat troops shows that within squads there gradually develops a teamwork of

understanding as to what different men in the squad will do under different conditions of combat and on different types of terrain. This can logically be expected and leads inevitably to equally logical conclusions that pre-planned procedures should be developed and agreed on before the squad is actually committed.

As a platoon advances to the attack, each committed squad has its own little battle. Since the number of maneuvers possible is very limited, it should not be particularly difficult to agree upon fixed maneuvers so that each man will know what his job is, once the direction of attack is shown to him. Such pre-planned maneuvers develop confidence within squads so that men move into the attack knowing that they are doing what their squad leader wants them to do and that their actions will fit into the pattern of what other members of the squad will be doing.

Battle Drill then is training that will instill confidence, individual initiative and aggressive behavior in soldiers and small unit commanders when conditions of close combat prevent unit leaders from giving clear oral orders or recognizable hand-and-arm signals.

It should be added that each soldier must not only know exactly what his squad should do under the conditions that exist but must have a full appreciation of the potential power of the weapons of the squad and how they can best be used. He must also know how the elements of a platoon cooperate in combat and must understand the use of ground and how to maneuver over it.

The ultimate goal in squad preparatory training is to develop each soldier's knowledge, instinct and coordination to the point where his unit can carry out the assault phase of an attack without receiving orders or signals. From the platoon point of view, squads are deployed by orders or signals to their respective zones of action, after which each squad is carried forward by the initiative of its members.

Basic Signals

When a combat situation does not permit the leader to use oral orders, he uses hand-and-arm or whistle signals.

ATTENTION



Extend arm sideward and slightly above horizontal and move towards head repeatedly.
Whistle: One short blast repeated if necessary.

MOVE FORWARD (frontal attack)



Thrust fist repeatedly to the front.

Whistle: Series of short blasts.

MANEUVER RIGHT



Thrust right fist repeatedly to the right.

Whistle: Two short blasts repeated if necessary.

MANEUVER LEFT



Thrust left fist repeatedly to the left.


Whistle: Three short blasts repeated if necessary.

The Squad

We will consider that the rifle squad always consists of a fire team and a maneuver team. These teams are interchangeable if the ground and conditions of the attack indicate the need. Squads must be trained so that individual members of each team know what to do from watching their leader or from his signals.

dicating the need. Squads must be trained so that individual members of each team know what to do from watching their leader or from his signals.

EACH RIFLE SQUAD HAS TWO BASIC BATTLE DRILL TEAMS




Squad Fixed Maneuvers

Combat conditions usually restrict the squad to four maneuvers. These are by either flank or straight forward and, less frequently and usually in mountains where enemy lines are close, the fire support element can remain in a single fixed position until the maneuver element reaches the enemy position.

In all four of these maneuvers the fire teams must be trained to execute two rules automatically: (1) to advance by fire and movement as long as the effectiveness of the team's fire can be improved by closer range and (2) to rejoin the maneuver element with all possible speed once its fire is masked.

THE BASIC MANEUVERS OF THE SQUAD



The Platoon

The basic element of the platoon is, of course the squad. The squads execute the platoon leader's battle drill plan in accordance with verbal orders or signals. The chart opposite pictures the platoon's basic battle drill team.

Fixed Maneuvers

A platoon normally advances to the attack in platoon column, line or wedge. The leading, or center, squad is the base squad in all fixed maneuvers. The platoon leader is with his advance group near the front of the column where he can usually give oral initial orders to squad leaders, tell squad leaders how and where he wants them to attack. When squads know the objective and the position from which they attack, they execute their movements as described in *squad fixed maneuvers*.

When the platoon leader finds that he cannot issue oral orders he uses either hand or whistle signals and the squads execute them in this manner:


Forward or Attack Forward

First squad attacks straight to the front.

Second squad in column, moves to the right of the leading squad and attacks.


Third squad in column moves to the left of the leading squad and extends the assault line.

Weapons squad selects ground to the right, left or center of the platoon from which it can best




Platoon—Forward or Attack Forward

support the advance of the platoon. It is a platoon fire team which maneuvers very much as the fire team for a squad. When the objective is taken it joins the rifle squads promptly and its automatic weapons are placed in position to thicken platoon fires and turn back any enemy counterattack.



Platoon—Maneuver Right

APRIL, 1953



The Platoon Basic Battle Drill Team

Maneuver Right

Second squad in column moves to a position on the right of the leading squad and attacks.

Third squad in column maneuvers to the extreme right and advances abreast of the squads already in line.

Weapons squad selects ground to the right, left or center of the platoon where it can support the platoon advance. It is a platoon fire team and maneuvers very much as the fire team of a squad. When the objective is taken it joins the rifle squads and emplaces its automatic weapons.

Maneuver Left

Maneuver left is executed exactly as *maneuver right* except that the squads in rear of the leading squads move to the left of the leading squad.

Patrols

The smallest patrol should consist of five men including the leader. This element can be increased by groups of four, one of whom is the team leader. A patrol therefore normally consists of five, nine or thirteen men. If a larger patrol is desired a squad increment may be used. Two squads are normally the next sized unit and if a still larger group is needed, a full platoon should be used.

Orders to patrols must state the mission clearly so that the leaders will know exactly what is expected of them.

Security patrols, reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols all require different actions by members of the patrol but basic principles of combat are practiced. When a patrol encounters the enemy it must always find and fix him. To do this the patrol uses fixed maneuvers so that its members may use their individual initiative, knowing that their actions will fit into the general plan. Immediate action when the enemy is encountered is extremely important. The enemy must be put on the defensive so that his movements are restricted and the patrol can move with greater freedom. Weapons must be used instantly and aggressively.

Normally a patrol moves in column or diamond formation with distances and intervals varying with the ground

and visibility. When the enemy is contacted the following actions should be taken as SOP:

The rifle grenadier (or patrol leader) fires a rifle flare in the direction of the enemy.

Previously designated members of the patrol immediately fire at least one clip of ammunition in an effort to make the enemy disclose his strength and position.

When the flare lights up the area, HE and white phosphorus rifle grenades should be fired and each member of the patrol fires one clip of ammunition across the enemy target.

The patrol leader decides upon the action he must take and gives necessary signals or orders.


Increments of a patrol are always divided into two or three man teams and these teams work together and care for each other, including evacuation of wounded men. When signals call for movement, these teams execute the maneuver together, not individually.

Enemy action frequently determines the actions of the rear or security element of a patrol and the leader of this element should be a man of intelligence and initiative. Frequently he will have to extricate other elements of the patrol from danger and at other times his element will be called on to cover an exposed flank which the patrol leader had thought secure from enemy envelopment.


Fixed Patrol Maneuvers

Five-man Patrol

Being small, these patrols usually move through enemy territory in an open squad column or diamond formation in order to have the best all around security. Battle Drill must be modified to accommodate the small number of men.



Five-man frontal attack



Five-man maneuver right



In forward or frontal attacks the patrol "hits the dirt" on signal by the leader and immediately begins to fire to the front. Members of the patrol maintain their relative position in the formation. The patrol leader fires his flare in the direction of the enemy. The rear man in the column moves to that flank where his "buddy" is, thus putting the patrol in a wedge formation (see cut).

To maneuver right the patrol fires to its right while maintaining its original formation each member being responsible for security to his exposed side (see cut).

To maneuver left the patrol reverses the procedure used in maneuver right.

Nine-man Patrol

This patrol executes the basic Battle Drill of the squad. The rear element is always the maneuver team. Both the fire and maneuver teams are responsible for their own flank security and each designates one man to be alert for rear security.



Thirteen-man Patrol


This patrol consists of three four-man teams which maneuver when given the signal by the patrol leader. Rear and flank security for patrols of this size and larger usually is the responsibility of the last four-man team in the patrol and is under the control of the assistant squad leader.

Forward or frontal attacks begin with the leading team opening fire on the enemy with flare, fire and grenades. The second team moves up on line to the right of the leading team and adds its fire to the attack. The third team moves


into position in the rear of the first two teams and faces so as to protect the rear and flanks (*see cut*). If executing a combat mission, the assaulting team moves forward as in squad fixed maneuvers with the rear security team adjusting its position to conform to the situation.

To maneuver right the first and second teams commence fire on signal and maneuver to their right flank. Flares, grenades and rifle fire are used aggressively. The third team moves to the right rear, taking position to protect the new rear of the patrol. The first two teams assault the enemy as in squad fixed maneuvers and the third team adjusts its position in order to protect the rear of the patrol. The patrol leader normally joins Team No. 2 at this time. Team No. 3 thickens the patrol's fire but continues to watch the rear and left.


To maneuver left the patrol reverses the procedures used in maneuver right.



Forward attack by 13-man squad



Maneuver right by 13-man squad



In next month's issue "Battle Drill" will be concluded with the description and illustration of training methods.

MACHINE GUNS

We Need Them

And they ought to be designed to do the job of protecting assaulting infantry in the final surge into the enemy's position

Lieutenant M. E. A. Gobus

DURING the two years that I have been a machine gun instructor in the Netherlands Army I have had a switch from British equipment and drill to the American way. This has given me a chance to compare British and U. S. methods of support by machine gun fire. For that reason Major Robert H. Clagett's article on machine guns in the October issue of *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* stimulated my interest and provoked my thinking.

As Major Clagett rightly put it at the end of his article: "We must design guns to fit our needs, not plan our uses around the guns provided us."

But do we actually need any automatic-firing small-caliber weapons in today's infantry? Riflemen today must have adequate supporting fire but can't this be furnished by many other weapons: mortars, howitzers and guns.

However, there is the 50 to 200 yards that, in the interest of safety, must be kept between the infantry and the impact zone of supporting fires. Here is where we must have a weapon that can be fired from our own lines (or slightly behind them) that has enough power and volume to force the enemy down. The needed power and volume will be found in the caliber of the bullet. It cannot be less than the normal caliber

of a rifle (shock-power), while the volume of fire must be sufficient to place a certain quantity of bullets in a certain place. So there we are—we need a more or less fast-firing weapon of the same caliber as our rifle.

This establishes our need for an automatic weapon. But what uses are we to put it to?

First it will be used to force the enemy to take cover when other kinds of fire must be stopped or lifted for the safety of our assaulting forces.

BALLISTICS show that every weapon, be it single-shot or automatic, has a cone of dispersion. We also know that the beaten zone of an automatic weapon is a pointed ellipse of relatively small width but of considerably great length. If we want to make the best use of this ellipse we must be able to place it where the enemy can be hurt by it. This calls for flanking fire. But we don't want our troops to run into our own fire so we should place the weapon on the far side of our flanks. This brings up the question of range.

We want to cover our men during the last 50 to 200 yards and at the same time we want to use this weapon for flanking fire. If we keep the range of the weapon inside the battalion's zone of action it need not fire more than 1000 yards. And this range should be enough to provide the necessary cover and the additional time for our actions.

Now where in our organization does this weapon fit?

For reasons of speed and supply as well as maneuverability, we cannot

equip our rifle squad with a machine gun, although the squad does need a weapon that will give it protective fire. It has the automatic rifle for this purpose, to be sure, but the squad still needs additional covering fire of greater volume than it gets from its own automatic rifle.

The machine gun, therefore, should be in the next higher unit, the platoon. That's where it is now. It gives the platoon commander a weapon with which he may cover the actions of one or two squads.

The beaten zone of the machine gun has characteristics similar to collective rifle fire, although the fixed mounting gives greater accuracy and closer grouping. As in collective rifle fire, the length of the beaten zone will decrease as the range increases. Still, the area of the beaten zone is such that the destructive or neutralizing effect of the fire of one machine gun becomes greatly reduced.

THERE are two ways to compensate for this reduction: by tightening up the cone of dispersion while keeping the same rate of fire, and by simply adding one machine gun, thus doubling the amount of strikes on the ground.

The first method calls for a highly superior type of machine gun which, I daresay, does not yet exist.

I think the second method is better, provided we design a machine gun that will not restrict the movements of the platoon.

The weapon must be light. To avoid additional weight, it should therefore be air-cooled, and belt fed.

LIEUTENANT M. E. A. GOBUS, Royal Netherlands Army, is, as he says in his article, a machine-gun instructor in his Army, teaching our own Army's methods. The requirements he states are sound and provocative, even though he may be overoptimistic about the ability of designers to achieve them.

The ammunition should be lighter than present ammunition.

Its rate of fire should be designed to give the maximum effect on the smallest possible beaten zone. That is, it should have a fast rate of fire and a comparatively tight cone of dispersion. The rate of fire should be adjustable. Could not a way be found to control the amount of gases used for the recoil?

We may be able in this way to pour the maximum number of bullets in a slightly increased beaten zone, while we also produce longer and slower neutralizing fires at a smaller portion of enemy ground.

As we do not need the use of these weapons at greater ranges than 1000 yards, the length of the barrel might be shortened to save weight. We might also economize on weight by omitting the micrometer adjustment on mountings.

For the necessary lateral corrections, we might simply copy the British: one tap to the left, at the back of the weapon, moves the weapon 15 minutes of a degree to the left.

The sights should be a combination of the sight used for the bazooka and the "sniper scope."

The gun should be capable of firing in all kinds of weather and terrain conditions. This does not mean that indirect firing is one of the main tasks. It simply means that we must be able to operate the gun when terrain and/or weather do not permit direct sighting and laying, for instance in fog or smoke screens. The elevating mechanism should be telescope-type with a simple click-indicator to slow the corrections.

What should be the maximum and minimum rates of fire?

AS Major Claggett stated, a man's normal reaction time is five-eighths of a second. This means that we have approximately three quarters of a second to hit a man. This means we must know how many bullets we need to fire in order to have the best chance to score a hit.

We should be able to determine this by considering the following factors:

How big is a normal human target?

What proportion of the beaten zone is occupied by the human target?

How many strikes would we need to score one hit on the human target in the center of the beaten zone?

The figure should tell us the number of rounds to be fired in three-quarters second and what the proper rate of fire should be. This rate can be slowed up if we want to neutralize the beaten zone.



This experimental British machine gun fires a 7mm round and is lighter than the Vickers which it may replace. Note that the gas regulator is similar to the one found on the Bren .303 light machine gun and the mount is from the Vickers .303 medium machine gun.

I realize that the problem is not as easy to solve as to state, so, I gladly leave that to competent technicians. But if the technicians can design and build a weapon with these characteristics and if two of these guns are given to each infantry platoon, I believe that the fighting power of the infantry company will be greatly increased. Also the water-cooled machine guns in the heavy weapons company could be discarded because every company commander would have adequate firepower.

The logistical side of the problem appears to be comparatively easy.

These guns are light so no motorized transportation is needed. The weapon should have a crew of two men, one carrying the gun, the other the mount, and each carrying two ammunition-belt boxes totaling 1000 rounds.

The weight of belts and boxes might be reduced by the use of specially prepared paper or cardboard for boxes and

reinforced strips of silk or nylon for belts. The total load of the crew should not exceed 20 to 25 pounds per man.

Ammunition supply should not worry the S4 as there would be no heavy machine gun platoon to supply.

I WOULD like to close with a few words about the final protective line. I think Major Claggett quite right in suggesting that FPL be abandoned. But not always. If we are able to establish FPL before the ground we choose to hold, let's do it.

But we should never select our positions depending on the FPL, for no FPL can guarantee the safety of our ground if the attacking enemy is eager and crafty enough to break through.

I hope these thoughts on the type and the use of machine guns will stir the tactical, technical and logistical experts into designing a weapon that will meet infantry's urgent needs.



WHETHER remembered or just imagined from hearing about it, Army life back in the thirties must now seem idyllic to many an Army wife: Quarters "on the post" for most officers on duty with troops (some of the quarters seemed pretty inadequate then, and they were); a full-time, "live-in" servant in most families (a good cook for thirty dollars a month); dressing for dinner a normal procedure (civilian evening clothes or dress blues or whites required for officers after Retreat on most posts, and steaks as you liked them instead of very rare as nowadays); orders collected and deliveries made by both the commissary and the post exchange (bills once a month, pay before the tenth); social life

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, retired, who lives in Washington, D. C., asked the editors to announce that he is leaving town the day this issue is put in the mails. No forwarding address. A former field artilleryman, General Blakeley commanded the 4th Infantry Division during the latter part of the European campaigns of 1944-45.

enlivened by polo, horse shows, and riding to hounds (and a hearty welcome from civilians at all horse shows).

But, dear wives, is your husband a lieutenant colonel at thirty-five? In those happy prewar years, he was lucky if he was not still a captain on his fortieth birthday.

There is one unchanging factor, though, and you wives of today should realize it: The Army wife has always been, and always will be, a vital factor in the success her husband attains.

IN offering some comments on the guidance of wives, the present writer (retired, happily married, and old enough not to know any better) realizes he is getting into a subject of considerable scope and more difference of opinion. To keep this piece within bounds, let us look primarily at the wife of the

career officer. The wife of the non-regular officer or of an enlisted man, whether he be a career master sergeant or a drafted private, has more difficult over-all problems than the wife of a regular officer, but, considered solely in terms of effect on her husband's career, the latter's adaptability, helpfulness and personal qualities have more influence. What are some of the ways that these characteristics, whether guided by inherent good judgment, by the husband, or by various outside influences, and how do they affect the husband's career? And how does the Army wife's position differ from that of the wife of a civilian executive?

Sometime ago *Life* published a provocative article, "The Wife Problem," which emphasized the value to young corporation executives of a wife who is "stabilized," "integrated," and "who

She is important to her husband's career

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

loves her husband's job." The author, William H. Whyte, Jr., drags the Army in, not too pleasantly, early in his piece. Speaking of "the corporation wife," he says: "Like an Army wife, an analogy she detests, she must be a highly adaptable mixer. In fact, she needs to be even more adaptable than the Army wife, for the social conditions she meets are more varied. One year she may be a member of a company community, another year a branch manager's wife, expected to integrate with the local community—or, in some cases, to become a civic leader, and frequently, as the wife of the company representative, to provide a way station on the route of touring company brass."

RIGHT here the experienced Army wife, brushing aside the "analogy-she-detests" crack, will testify that no one outside the services needs to be more adaptable than the Army wife or meets more varied social situations. What corporation wife could equal the experience of being a lieutenant's wife living in a small, overcrowded town, fifteen miles from the post, and then in rapid succession following a husband as he is a student living on a post; an associate professor in a college located in a large city; the only representative of the Army in a midwestern town, which is a National Guard regimental headquarters; a staff officer in Washington; duty, at various times, with troops on foreign service—Japan, Germany, Trieste or any one of many other spots; more school, military or civilian; then perhaps military attaché in a cosmopolitan foreign city, followed by troop duty in Texas? What corporation executive would have to adapt himself to the ways of so many different superiors in a like period? The husband may also have been a post exchange and commissary officer, sat as a summary court, been a provost marshal, and had a few chaplains, lawyers and doctors under his command—all jobs with social implications, and perhaps unsociable reactions, for the wife. And finally, no corporation asks a sacrifice equal to that of a service wife left alone in the States while her husband is in combat overseas.

A retired officer commented recently that he had seen a well-known cavalryman only twice: once, many years ago, when the latter was a military attaché in Europe and was attending, at a ceremony, the king of the country to which he was assigned. The cavalryman was turned out in the old full-dress blues with high-collared, double-breasted coat,

sky-blue breeches with yellow stripe, black boots, spurs, white gloves and saber. The next time the officer saw him he was sitting, clad in a sweaty oil shirt and breeches, on a crate in the back room of a Fort Riley post exchange supervising the sorting of rotten apples out of a shipment which had just been delivered in bad condition. Army wives have known, and will know, even greater variety of position and environment.

Mr. Whyte thinks that the good wife is good by *not* doing things—"by *not* complaining when her husband works late; by *not* fussing when a transfer is



coming up; by *not* engaging in any controversial activity." Here the Army wife has the advantage that she ought not to be as tempted to "fuss" as her civilian counterpart. The latter may find all three of these examples reasonable subjects for her intervention. The Army wife soon learns that her husband has little choice in these matters. If he is Officer of the Day, a detail which peculiarly often requires a night of work, he is and that is that. On the other side of the picture, the Army wife who cannot achieve these negative values is doing her husband more harm than is the corporation executive's wife, and she had better realize it early in her career as an Army wife.

ANOTHER piece of negative advice might well be added: Don't be too anything. This applies to all types of activity—sports, painting, gardening, dog raising, bridge playing, drinking, even being a "do-gooder." Moderation is appreciated in both officers and wives.

Don't be too possessive. It's natural

and commendable to speak of "our regiment" if you are a junior officer's wife, but if you are the regimental commander's wife it sounds better to let the regiment be your husband's. It is well established that "rank hath its privileges" and some of the RHIP inevitably goes to a wife as her husband climbs up the ladder. The rank, however, is strictly the husband's. The general's wife who refers to "our aides" and "my girls" probably does it from a spouse-of-the-head-of-the-family viewpoint, but she is sometimes misunderstood.

The family feeling should be a source of comfort and pride to service wives. Mrs. Lemuel Shepherd, wife of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, once commented that one of the great satisfactions of service life was "that certain family feeling" within the Marine Corps. In the Army such association, particularly in our infantry and cavalry regiments, was also a source of *esprit* up to World War I. In the greatly expanded, widely scattered (and somewhat transfer-happy) Army of today, the young soldier's need of associating himself with something less huge and vague than the whole United States Army has not been met, and the Army bride must also have a lost feeling not experienced, to such a degree at least, by her predecessors of quieter days.

With the passing of time—and assignments and stations—the wife's feeling of "belonging" nevertheless increases, and from it should come a loyalty to the service and a pride in her husband's contributions to the Army which she should express—particularly to her husband. To go to the other extreme of wifely attitudes, the officer whose wife believes that he should get out of the Army is under a psychologically depressing influence which is bound to affect his work. The wife with this belief should go on to a prompt showdown in the matter, or keep her opinion to herself.

THE wife also needs to have executive qualities, because even in peacetime, the husband will often be away on maneuvers or inspection trips, and she must run the household unaided. Then there is the point, not to be overlooked by the wife who is ambitious for her husband, that plain hard work is a factor in success in the military profession as it is in civilian life, and the husband who is not burdened by daily family problems is better able to devote his energies to his job.

There is, of course, the occasional situation in which the wife *should* urge

separation from the service. The financial problem will normally be the major one in such a case, but if the husband is not primarily interested in his job, the sooner the change is made the better. An officer who is irritable, depressed, and always anxious to get away from his work in order to get busy on some hobby, sport or other change of effort is not headed toward success.

Whether you live on a post or in a civilian community, it might be well to remember that your husband may well be judged by your neighbors largely on how your children behave. Would you like to have your husband done out of the job of chief of staff of an important command because the general couldn't stomach the idea of having your children living next door to him? It might happen. Or a commanding officer might just think that an officer with such brats for children must be lacking in some essential quality of leadership and discipline, even though the behavior of the youngsters might be your fault.

On the financial side, do you plan with your husband? Do you save for something that you want, and then buy it, or do you run up bills and installment obligations beyond his income? In most cases, he, and his career, are what suffer most if you get him into debt.

Have you faced up to the fact that you must know enough about your joint affairs so that in case of your husband's sudden death or serious injury you would have some idea what to do and what you have to do it with? It is an unpleasant and complex subject, but it's something you can work out much better with your husband now than you can stand having all the problems dumped on you alone when you are suffering from shock.

On the social side, the wife who doesn't realize the advantages of a well-run home, and of what is indicated by that overworked phrase "gracious living," is miscast as an officer's wife. And "gracious living" doesn't mean silver, fine linen, servants and a spacious house—even if those things do help. I've seen a general's wife manage some very gracious living in a tourist camp in Noodles, California, in midsummer.

The wife new to the Army will soon find that what is good taste and good manners in her home community is applicable to Army social relationships. Calling in the Army, for example, has changed, by force of changed conditions, as it has in civil life, but it is easy to ask what is the custom in a particular command. The purpose of the exchange

of calls has always been to permit the newcomer to become acquainted.

The requirements on small regimental posts were designed to meet this requirement, but sometimes resulted in odd situations. On one post, a newly married second lieutenant was assigned a small set of quarters when he reported, and he and his bride called promptly on the "chain of command" up through the regimental commander. The colonel and his wife returned the call about a week later, and the colonel casually remarked that he hoped that the bride had met most of the post families. She innocently replied that only two couples had called so far. At officers' call the next day, the colonel made some emphatic remarks about the importance of calling promptly on new arrivals. That evening, the lieutenant was Officer of the Day and absent from his quarters while the bewildered bride did the best she could receiving sixty-three callers in a little less than two hours. But she had a good story to tell in later years.

It is probably true that in almost all social matters, the Army tends to be conservative, and to hold to customs and traditions longer than many civilian communities. A minor example is the tendency to a much greater use of first names by young women addressing older women than was regarded as permissible a generation ago. The Army bride would be well advised, in most cases, not to assume that she is expected to call the wives of senior officers by their first names just because they so address her—and even if asked to do so, avoidance of sounding too familiar on formal occasions is wise.

In general, the question of the relations of the wife of a junior officer with the wives of his seniors is not a difficult tight rope to be walked with extreme caution. Rather it is a broad comfortable path of courteous civility to older women avoiding two fatal extremes: On the one hand, to be coldly distant with a chip on the shoulder; on the other to "bootlick."

For the Army wife who has had no knowledge of service life before her marriage, there are many helpful books. For general information about the Army, there are books like *The Officer's Guide*, and *The Army Officer's Guide*; more specifically helpful are volumes like Nancy Shea's *The Army Wife*.

The officer-enlisted man relationship changed somewhat during World War II, but the wife would do well to remember that the basis of the social separation which some civilians charge to snobbery is based on the fact that offi-

cers must sit in judgment as to rewards and punishments of the men of their commands, and the soldier who sees the family of a fellow soldier associating closely in off-duty hours with an officer's family, is going to doubt that the officer will be completely impartial in his decisions as they affect that soldier.

I once had the son of the Inspector General of the Army in my battery. On two occasions when he was sent to my quarters with papers for me to sign, he refused even to sit down when my wife, who knew him well, asked him to. Later, he took a competitive examination for a commission and was one of the winners. The day he was commissioned, he came to our quarters at 1000 hours and stayed to lunch.

"Army brats" who go into the service, usually have a particularly high sense of responsibility, and of dedication to duty, honor, and country. The mother has invariably contributed to these qualities. When Lieutenant James A. Van Fleet, Jr., son of the Eighth Army commander, was reported missing in action in Korea, General Van Fleet gave to the press the contents of a letter which the son had recently written to his mother. A few sentences from it indicate a great deal about Army family relationships:

Dear Mother: This is a letter to an Army wife. I don't want tears spilled on it! . . . Do not pray for me, but for my crew, who are not professional men, but civilians whom the United States called upon to defend their homes in this moment of need. They have wives who wait for their return, families not yet started. I will do my best . . .

It would be better, I'm sure, to let the final word be said by an Army wife who is descended, on both sides, from families that have been in the Regular Army for five generations, and is the wife of a colonel of artillery. Susie Lane Hoyle Armstrong summed up today's challenge to the Army wife in these words in the *Army Information Digest*:

"I do not weep for the 'old Army,' much as I loved it. Each generation is confronted in turn by a newer generation which refers nostalgically to the 'good old days' their seniors thought so revolutionary! Changes have come as our horizons have broadened, and the new way is almost always an improvement. But the fine traditions that form the intangible core of a soldier's career will never vanish. New Army wives, meeting the challenge of increased responsibilities carried by the Army today, have been given an opportunity to contribute to the building of that tradition."

LOW REPORTS—

A suggestion for getting around that stinker
who unfairly hits you with a low OEI

WE'VE had some chance recently to get closely acquainted with today's efficiency reports and how they work. There is a certain amount of improvement over the reports used before and during the war, and right after the war. But some of the old, old faults are still there.

It does seem that by this time we could find some way to prevent most of these faults.

Take the ancient business of the stinker who gives you a report that is a terrific stinker itself. You've been doing O.K. for several years, hitting at least high excellent or low superior. Then, wham! Here you are under a guy who starts chewing when the two of you first get officially acquainted. And you don't take it any too easily—you've got a little pride, and you think you're as good as he is, or maybe better.

But a year goes by, and maybe another. And eventually you get to Washington (or make somebody there your agent to take a look for you) and see what this brother officer has done to you.

Just a drop from, say, an OEI of 115 or better down to 75, or even 60 or 65.

Just enough to ruin you for quite a while—or perhaps for good.

It doesn't happen to very many. But it does happen.

It can quite conceivably happen to any very able officer who just doesn't click with some type of superior.

A SITUATION just as tough—and one just as human—is that of the rating officer who takes the words on the efficiency report form absolutely literally. Often this man is a pleasant, quite likable person. But he is just plain dumb about the practical workings of efficiency reports.

Take, for example, that general in the days before the war—one of the finest superior officers you would ever want to serve under. He had the same aide for eight years. The general and his wife were childless and the aide and his wife were actually like son and daughter to them. But for eight long, long years the general gave his aide and friend a "middling excellent" efficiency report, just about ruining his chances of ever becoming a gen-

eral officer. The old man was just too literal-minded about the wording on the efficiency report form. He felt that it would have been improper for him to exaggerate the good qualities of his aide by stretching things.

Or take one other case of the present day—a lieutenant colonel at a station where he happens to occupy an administrative position that requires him to make out a sizable number of efficiency reports. This man is another conservative "low excellent" marker. To him "very satisfactory" is a good, complimentary rating.

One young and able reserve officer served under this man for two and a half years. His OEI for this period was about 89, well below the average. The young officer had further hard luck to be selected for two years of special schools right after this—so his OEI is still 89 since schools don't make out detailed reports. But this man's most recent report, covering six months, gives him an OEI of 141. Being a brilliant and able specialist of fine character and bearing, actually with excellent relationships with those under whom and with whom he works, this officer is probably going to continue to receive highly superior reports of an OEI of 130 or better.

BUT the damage is already done. This officer has been passed over for promotion. Moreover, in appealing to our Association on what has happened to him, this officer points out that every officer, whether regular or reserve, who has served any length of time under this same man and was directly rated by him, has been passed over.

What's the remedy?

Well, in the first place every officer should see every efficiency report submitted on him, and should have to sign that he has seen it. And he should be allowed to make in writing any comment he wishes about the report.

Also, every superior who gives an officer a mediocre or worse rating, or who drops him more than 15 points, should be required to state his actions toward improving the man so rated. It is most certainly a sign of poor leadership for a year to pass without such corrective action. Ordinarily

a superior officer should be able in thirty days to assess the faults of an officer under him—and tell him about them.

Reports that show failure to take repeated corrective action as needed should be canceled, and put in the file of the reporting officer as an adverse comment on his own efficiency.

THE finest way of handling junior officers we have ever heard of was the method of a major we once knew (a man who was later killed most cruelly by the Japanese who captured him). This man, as battalion commander, would have a talk with every officer under him, a month or so after he first knew the officer.

To an officer not doing so well, he would say, "Son, I want you to buck up in (naming the difficulty). If you don't I won't be able to give you the superior or excellent efficiency report I want to when the year is up." He would then go on in a good-natured but firm way to suggest ways of doing better. And he would end by asking the junior to come around and talk things over when he felt he would like to.

Or if the officer was doing well instead of poorly, he would tell him: "I'm much obliged to you for the way you're putting out for the battalion. You just keep it up and I'll be giving you superior on your report when the time comes."

Leadership demands this kind of open discussion by rating officers. The efficiency of most subordinates can be improved, if you work at it properly.

There are other things wrong with efficiency reports and we'll go into them at another time. We should keep at this business until we arrive at some real improvements. "Good enough" is not anywhere near good enough.

Next time, probably, we'll discuss whether it is right that the Army should never forgive—whether one pretty bad black mark when you're young and full of energy and ambition should count against you twenty or thirty years later, when your report cards show you've been a real good boy during the whole long time of maturity after you once learned a few early lessons in discipline.



This is the computer chassis of Remington Rand's small-size business electronic calculator.

All photographs by Barrett Gallagher for *Fortune*

ROBOT GENERAL

Will the amazing capabilities of electronic "brains" ever displace the officer's staff out of business?

MAJOR LESLIE G. CALLAHAN

THE security guard was just changing outside the big door deep in the Pentagon bomb shelter. The regular attendants, military and civilian, were reporting for the day shift. We were in another global war.

Twenty-four hours a day the latest intelligence and logistic reports fed into this room by teletype, television, radio, and other high-speed devices. The whole Rhine River campaign was being directed in this same room. Yet there was no confusion, no duplication, no delay. For all this information was channeled into a single "brain." And decisions went out to every unit concerned in seconds of time after the "brain" had reached the best solution.

MAJOR LESLIE G. CALLAHAN, JR., Artillery, is on duty in the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, having recently been transferred from the AA&GM Branch of The Artillery School, Fort Bliss, where he was an instructor in the Guided Missiles Department. Major Callahan graduated from the Military Academy in 1944 and received his Master's Degree in electrical engineering from the University of Pennsylvania in 1951.

Unlike its human counterpart, this "robot general" needed no rest. He (or it) was free of prejudice, made purely logical decisions. This computer, this brain, was the culmination of twenty years of development from the simple-minded computing machines of the 1950s.

There were twelve more large "brains" much like BRAIN ABLE, the one conducting the Rhine campaign. All of them had large air-conditioned rooms. The Air Force was using BRAIN BAKER to determine the best design for a new long-range missile. BRAIN CHARLIE was making a study for the Treasury Department of how best to finance the newest military weapons. Other governmental departments were using the other great computers to solve the many domestic and international problems that faced the U. S. in 1970.

It is hard to conceive what the actual development will be in the next twenty years. I've just suggested several possibilities. We can equally expect completely automatic factories, automatic billing machines, automatic weather forecasting, and automatic flood control,

among other far-reaching possibilities. Whereas the first "industrial revolution" of a century ago freed mankind from his menial physical tasks, the new one is freeing him from his menial mental tasks.

IN 1930 Dr. Vannevar Bush and his associates built the first differential analyzer, entirely mechanical, having no electric parts except motors. By 1940 work was begun on electronic computers which have generally replaced the early mechanical models. Finally the ballistic

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problems of modern fire control and the financial resources of our military establishment brought the artificial brain from fancy to fact. The ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) now at Aberdeen Proving Ground recently ran off a series of ballistic computations of 52 hours of continuous running that it would have taken a human operator 25 years of 48-hour weeks to do. In the fire direction, the human being is simply too slow to compute corrections.

Air Force project scoop has as its objective the design of a big machine to

figure the economic or logistic support for any military campaign. It will take in raw data on men and equipment and spew out in a few hours a breakdown for the making of decisions, planning and scheduling.

The ultimate aim of SCOOP is not unlike BRAIN ABLE, outlined in the open paragraphs of this article. In military personnel and administration, commercial IBM computing machines are being used in increasing numbers. The services are beginning to use punched cards and computing machines to set up a more efficient supply system. The computer may mean the maximum utilization of our manpower, by freeing many administrative and staff people for other duties.

The computer is also rapidly changing our notions of design engineering. Instead of a long period of model construction and empirical testing, the complete physical system, whether it is that of a new factory or an engine, or a guided missile, can be simulated in a computer. The computer will then determine the exact specifications of components for the final system. An airplane

can be built without constructing a physical model or making extensive wind-tunnel tests. A factory may be laid out and efficient organization begun without costly production changes.

Today artificial brains can:

Learn what you tell them.

Apply instructions when they are needed.

Read and remember numbers.

Perform mathematical operations.

Look up numbers in tables.

Look at a result, and make a choice.

Do long chains of the above operations one after another.

Write out an answer.

Make sure the answer is right.

Know when one problem is finished and turn to another.

Determine most of their own instructions.

Work unattended.


These machines are very reliable. Even with thousands of parts, the existing giant brains have had few breakdowns. Some machines have become afflicted with near-human neuroses. When undisciplined memories take hold of a


ROBOT MINERALS

abilities of elec-
tronic staff
of business?

AHAN, JR.

This is the assembly
line where IBM
puts together its
No. 604 electronic
calculator





This is UNIVAC, the large, general-purpose electronic computer built by the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corp. (a subsidiary of Remington Rand) at a cost of more than \$700,000. The Census Bureau is using it.

machine, it has to be cured by rest, electric shock, or lobotomy (disconnecting parts of the machine).

No artificial brain so far built can:

Do initiative thinking.

Make bright guesses, and leap to conclusions.

Determine all its own instructions.

Perceive complex situations outside itself and interpret them.

A clever wild animal can do all of these things. There is reason to believe that some of them will be done in the future by machines.

THERE are two general kinds of computing machines: data-reduction, and mathematical.

Data reduction machines receive voluminous data from physical measurements or description and reduce them to simple readable forms. The machine record cards used to tabulate morning reports are an example. The Post Office Department uses this type of computer in handling money order receipts. The orders themselves are on punched cards.

Mathematical machines receive data and then use mathematical processes, including arithmetic, calculus, logic, etc., to solve a problem in much the same way a human being would, but tremendously faster.

Computers are either "general-purpose" or "special-purpose."

A special-purpose machine is designed to solve problems from one narrow field. An anti-aircraft computer is a good example.

A general-purpose machine, however, can solve many types of problems and perform many combinations of mathematical operations according to the way the components are connected up over a period of time. The connections can be rapidly changed. ENIAC, BRAIN ABLE and SCOOP, already mentioned, are of the general-purpose type.

The three kinds of mathematical computers are the analogue and digital types, and the combination of those two, the analogue-digital.

Machines that handle information as measurements of physical quantities are called analogue machines, because the measurement is analogous to, or like, the information. Numbers are converted by the machine for the purpose of computation into physically measured quantities such as lengths, voltages, or angles of displacement. A slide rule is an example; lengths correspond to the logarithms of numbers, and are added and subtracted, and numerical answers are read from the scale.

Results are obtained by interaction of moving parts or electrical signals arranged in such a manner as to solve an equation or perform a set of mathematical operations. The precision of any

analogue device depends upon the precision with which it is built, the skill and uniformity of the operator, and the precision which the output (result) can be read from a calibrated scale. It is, in short, subject to systematic and human errors. It performs its operations at the speed of light.

Digital devices are those which perform mathematical operations with numbers expressed as digits which can assume only discrete values, and which give results in digits. Precision depends only on the number of digits the machine can handle. Mathematical operations are done in much the same way as the longhand methods by human beings. The Chinese abacus is an example. Digital computers can be made as accurate as desired. They are somewhat slower than analogue computers.


The makers of many new computers seek to obtain both the speed of analogue and the accuracy of digital machines by combining them.

THERE are generally five basic groups of components in a general purpose computing machine (see cut).


The control block supervises the operation by positioning the appropriate switches at the proper time. It determines the flow of information from system to system. For an analogue computer, control may be exercised by hand-operated switches; and for a digital computer, by relays or vacuum tube gates. Control systems are not necessary in special-purpose computers.

The input system introduces the raw data into the computer. For analogue computers the input may be a rotating

Inside of the IBM electronic calculator.



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Block diagram of general purpose automatic computing machine.

shaft or a variable voltage. For digital computers the input may be a coded punched tape or a magnetic drum with magnetized parts or spots on motion picture type film.

Note that input can go either to storage or computation.

The output system records the solution of the problem introduced into the machine in a way it can be interpreted (read). The output for an analogue computer may be a meter or a mechanical dial. For a digital computer it may be a succession of lights or punched cards or tapes. So the chart shows output can receive either from storage or from the computation.

The storage system simplifies the computer by enabling it to store certain functions or tables to help solve problems. Specially formed, electric, empirically wound resistances or special shaped cams are examples of analogue storage elements. Coded punched tapes representing ballistic tables, rotating magnetic drums or types are examples of digital storage. It can also store answers of one step of a problem for use in a later step.

Information in the storage system can either go to computation or directly to output.

But it is the computation system that is really the heart of the computer for all the other data flow through it. It carries out the mathematical processes. Analogue computers contain devices that perform addition, subtraction and other arithmetical operations and differentiations and integrations for calculus operations. Digital computers, however, will only do the arithmetic processes; calculus problems must first be broken down by numerical analysis into a series of arithmetical operations.

We ourselves may be thought of as automatic computing machines. If you are asked to solve $(12 \times 12) + 105 = ?$

here is what you would do:

Read problem with your eyes (*Input*).

Your brain control sends the 12 times 12 to your memory of the multiplication table (*in storage*).

Your brain control takes the answer (144) from memory, looks at the plus sign and tells computation part of your brain to add this to 105 (*Computation*).

You write out the answer by a muscular movement of your hand, else you speak it with your mouth (*Output*).

Control is, of course, ever present to bring about the desired flow of information.


It is highly probable that in the near future the military establishment will be using automatic computing machines to solve many, many routine analytical problems that require at present many staff and clerical personnel. This will mean a great saving in manpower and

a more efficient military setup. In the endless struggle for military superiority, the relative speed of advancement of "robot generals" will become a vital test of military leadership by bringing more manpower to the front lines and permitting more efficient tactics.

Cost will somewhat restrict computer use at lower headquarters. The UNIVAC recently built for the Bureau of Census and the SEAC built by the Bureau of Standards will cost nearly a million dollars each. New design and experience will probably cut this cost.

Already, these automatic computing machines have synthetically reproduced many of man's thought processes, but of course they remain "thinking robots." The integrated muscular system of the human body has never been equaled in any man-made machine. Science has surpassed the body's ability to perform certain tasks, but pound for pound, dollar for dollar, and inch for inch, considering its adaptability and flexibility, the physical body remains supreme.

Shows some of the working parts of UNIVAC, the Remington Rand computer.





An Air Force evacuation helicopter is refueled when it lands near a hospital in Korea

Oil for the Machines of War

PETROLEUM powers and lubricates the machines of modern war to an even greater extent than it serves the civilian economy of the United States. Oil supplies well over half of the nation's fuel needs at home but that percentage skyrockets in Korea and other lands where Uncle Sam's defense forces are deployed. Without liquid fuels our military force would lose practically all of its striking power; tanks, ships, planes and other mechanized weapons and equipment would be immobilized.

Petroleum products used in Korea include regular gasoline for tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, aviation gasoline, kerosene, fuel oil for ships, lubricants, asphalt, jellied gasoline for bombs and diverse by-products like TNT, DDT, medicines, adhesive tape and plastics. That requires a lot of drum rolling.

Here are a few statistics that give just a hint of the amount of petroleum needed to run a modern war:

An armored battalion requires at least 17,000 gallons of gasoline to move 100 miles.

A plane can consume as much as 980 gallons of high-octane gasoline in one hour's flying. For one long-range round trip, a B-29 requires a tankcar full of

high-octane gasoline—10,000 gallons—and the newer bombers far exceed that figure. At the prewar average of 650 gallons a year, that amount of fuel would run a family car for more than 15 years! And yet the jets are even greater consumers of fuel.



Used oil is useful as a dust settler, as this South Korean demonstrates. Dry Korean summers make dust clouds a hazard to heavy military traffic

The Army uses petroleum to move practically everything that has wheels, from tanks to jeeps and motorcycles. (The tires of those vehicles are of synthetic rubber made from oil.)

The Navy is at least 99 per cent converted to liquid fuels.

With all of this, however, U. S. military requirements still account for only 5 per cent of this country's total domestic oil demand. In 1952, that demand approximated 2.650 billion barrels.

Latest government estimates are that total demand will double during the next quarter century. That is why the oil industry is vigorously expanding its producing, refining and transportation facilities. Oil men are confident they can keep well ahead of that rising demand. Each year they find about twice as much new oil as is consumed. They believe that even if a global war came, this nation would get all the oil it needs, of the quality it needs, delivered to the places where it will do the most good.



A jeep gets filled at a roadside filling station and Korean laborers unload drums of gasoline from railroad cars into trucks for shipment forward




South Koreans hand-pump gasoline from drums into five-gallon "Jerry" cans for transfer to vehicles of an armored unit



THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE U. S. S. R.

Raymond L. Garthoff

This article will appear as an appendix in *Soviet Military Doctrine*, by Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff, to be published this Spring by The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.



THIS article depicts in five charts, and a brief commentary, the organization of the agencies of the high command of the Soviet armed forces.

Ministry Level

The general place of the armed forces in the Soviet governmental structure is diagrammed in Chart 1. Since February 1950, the Ministry of War (VM) and the Ministry of the Navy (MVNF) have been independent of one another. Prior to 1946, they had been combined in the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and from February 1946 to February 1950, in the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS)¹.

From June 30, 1941 to September 19, 1945, a State Defense Committee (GKO), comprised of five to eight of the members of the Politburo, headed by Stalin, replaced the *Sovnarkom* (Council of Peoples' Commissars) as the direct authority over all Commissariats engaged in defense work.² Directly under it was the GHQ or *Stavka*, a select personal staff of twelve to fourteen top military leaders including the Chief of Staff, which advised the commander-in-chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin.

Stalin served as Peoples' Commissar of Defense (after February 1946, Minister of the Armed Forces) from July 1941 to March 1947. Upon his resignation, Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, a political figure and his deputy, replaced him. Bulganin remained as Minister, until in March 1949, his first deputy, Marshal

¹In February 1946, for one month, it was retitled the Peoples' Commissariat of the Armed Forces (NKVS). Just as this article went to press, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy were merged again into a single Ministry of Defense (MO), under Marshal Nikolai Bulganin.

²Originally the five members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria. Later Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan were added, and Bulganin replaced Voroshilov.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, a specialist on Soviet affairs, has been a member of the staff of The Rand Corporation since 1950. He graduated from Princeton University, and earned his master's and doctor's degrees at Yale, where he specialized in Soviet studies.

CHART 2. The Soviet Ministry of War





CHART 3. Headquarters of the Soviet Army Air Force



Alexander Vasilevsky, succeeded him. Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Marshal Bulganin again assumed the post of Minister of War, with Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov as First Deputy Ministers.

Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, former Imperial General Staff colonel, and Chief of Staff in 1919-1920 and 1927-1931, was again in that post from May 1937 until his final retirement in November 1942 (except for a brief retirement while General Kyril Meretskov held the post from August 1940 to February 1941, and Marshal [then Army General] Grigory Zhukov from February to October 1941). His resignation, due to severe illness, brought into that post his protégé and pupil, General (since then Marshal) Alexander Vasilevsky. Duties on the *Stavka* and as its representative at the front caused Vasilevsky, like Zhukov, to be away for long periods, during which his deputy, General A. E. Antonov, was for all practical purposes the Chief of Staff. In 1945, Antonov was Chief of Staff while Vasilevsky prepared and directed the Far Eastern campaign. Upon his return, Vasilevsky resumed his position as Chief of Staff from March 1946 until November 1948. As noted above, from March 1949 to March 1953 he served as Minister of

War. Army General Sergei Shtemenko succeeded Vasilevsky as Chief of Staff. He, even more than Vasilevsky, was a relatively junior officer for appointment to this position; he is believed to be a protégé of Vasilevsky. In February of this year Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky succeeded Shtemenko as Chief of Staff.

Ground Forces

THE Soviet Army was originally termed the RKKA, or Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, a designation not officially dropped until shortly before the recent war. But the term "Red Army" was retained until September 1946, at which time it was replaced by the designation "The Soviet Army."

Chart 2 diagrams the general organization of the present Ministry of War, which differs in some respects from the wartime Commissariat of Defense. It should be stressed that the Chief Administrations (GU)³ are not command channels to the Army field forces, but in most cases concern themselves largely with technical matters including ordnance development. The exceptions are noteworthy and are discussed below.

The wartime Chief Administration


³This term is sometimes translated "Main Directorate" or "Main Administration."

of Counter-Intelligence (GUKR or *Smersh*) was actually not subordinate to the Commissariat at all, but remained under the political police (in the NKVD until April 1943, when it was removed, and in May 1943 placed under the new NKGB, which became in March 1946 the MGB, or Ministry of State Security). Thus, counter-intelligence has been conducted exclusively by the MGB-MVD which attaches its own officers who remain responsible only to it. This should not be confused with Military Intelligence (GRU), not shown on Chart 2, which is under the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, and is a part of the army.

Similarly the Chief Political Administration is closely tied to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The wartime partisans were organized (with increasing central control) under a special partisan command headed by Marshal Voroshilov.

Finally, the existence of separate Chief Administrations for Airborne Troops (VDV), the Long-range Air Force (ADD) and Air Defense (PVO) is significant, since it reflects their special character as independent from field army group command. These forces are considered as special resources of the GHQ (*Stavka*); the first two to be di-



rected or assigned for special missions, and the latter as an independent defense command (embracing warning systems, fighter interception, and anti-aircraft artillery).

Air Forces

THE air power of the USSR is divided among seven air forces: the Army Air Force (VVS-SA), the Naval Air Force (VVS-VMF), the Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense (IA-PVO), the Long-Range Air Force (ADD), the Civil Air Fleet (GVF), the Arctic Air Force (under the Chief Administration for the Northern Sea Route), and probably a small MGB-MVD Air Force.

This is not so complex or confusing as it may appear. The main air force, often called (abroad) the Soviet Air Force, or SAF, is the Army Air Force, literally, the "Military Air Force of the Soviet Army" (VVS-SA). The VVS is subordinate to the Ministry of War; there is not, and has never been, a Ministry of the Air Force. Chart 3 is a diagram of the internal organization of the Army Air Force. As will be seen, the field force consists of air armies, which are assigned to army groups ("fronts") or other army field commands for tactical support by fighter, ground attack, reconnaissance, and bomber aviation.

The Navy

CHART 4 shows the organization of the Ministry of the Navy. The combat commands are the four fleets: Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific. Coastal ground defenses (which are a concern


of the Navy within fifty kilometers of the coast, except in the front combat zone), naval bases and the land-based naval air force are all subordinated to the appropriate regional fleet command. Data on the organization of the Ministry of the Navy are only approximate.

Glossary of Soviet Military Organizations

This brief glossary of Soviet military organizations is confined to organizations mentioned in the accompanying article. Our readers who are students of the Russian language or who are interested in extending their knowledge of Soviet organization may find this glossary of value. Others will doubtlessly find the author's translation of these titles into English more than adequate.

Voennoe Ministerstvo (VM)	Ministry of War
Ministerstvo Voenno-Morskogo Flota (MVMF)	Ministry of the Navy
Narodnyi Komissariat Oborony (NKO)	Peoples' Commissariat of Defense
Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony (GKO)	State Defense Committee
Raboche-Krest'ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia (RKKA)	Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
Sovetskaia Armiia (SA)	The Soviet Army
Glavnye Upravleniia (GU)	Chief Administrations
Glavnoe Upravlenie Kontr-Razvedkoi (GUKR or Smersh)	Chief Administration of Counter-Intelligence
Voennye Vozdushnye Sily (VVS-SA)	Military Air Force of The Soviet Army
Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del (MVD)	Ministry of Internal Affairs
Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del (NKVD)	Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs
Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (MGB)	Ministry of State Security
Ministerstvo Oborony (MO)	Ministry of Defense

CHART 5. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)¹



Since 1946, all counterintelligence has been central in the MVD-MGB. During the last war, GUKR (Chief Administration for Counterintelligence), also called "Smersh" (Death to Spies), was the NKVD, later NKGB-MGB, and now MVD organization in the Armed Forces.

Positive intelligence is carried on in peace and war, conflicting to an undetermined extent with Military Intelligence (GRU), (which is probably the better in military intelligence).

Until very recently, these were MGB functions. Now the frontier guards, internal security troops, labor camp guards, coastal frontier sea patrol, the small police air force, and in wartime rear security detachments and POW guards, are under the MVD.

The uniformed civil police or "militia" was also an MGB chief administration until it was recently merged into the MVD.

¹Until recently the MGB (Ministry of State Security) had control over the frontier guards, internal security troops, and militia. In March 1953, the MGB was merged into the MVD, and placed again under Marshal Beria.

Paramilitary Organizations

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), before March 1946 the NKVD, is the successor to the original *Cheka* (ChK) (later GPU and OGPU) political police. The MVD was gradually shorn of its para-military, intelligence and counter-intelligence functions from 1943 to 1949, as they were placed in the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Following Stalin's death, in March 1953 the MGB was merged in the MVD, and Marshal Beria again became Minister. Chart 5 outlines its para-military functions.

The prewar *Osoaviakhim* or Voluntary Society for the Support of Aviation and Chemistry, which had civil defense and premilitary training duties, was split in May 1948 into three new societies: *Dosarm*, the Voluntary Society for Support of the Army; *Dosflot*, the Voluntary Society for Support of the Navy; the *Dosav*, the Voluntary Society for Support of the Air Force. In September 1951 they were again amalgamated into a single central All-Union Society called *DOSAAR*, under Colonel General V. I. Kuznetsov. Membership is estimated at over fifteen million.

Editing Is Such Sweet Sorrow

It is a good idea at times for the editors and the readers to consider together the purposes and problems of a publication like this one. It helps give perspective and sometimes it helps clear the air—for the editors as well as the readers. This seems to be a good time to do it, for there are problems connected with the publication of the **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL** that we think may be more easily solved if our readers know about them and give some thought to their solution.

THE place of **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL** and the Association of the U. S. Army (including its predecessor magazines and associations) is self-evident. For a half century it has promoted the best interests of the Army as it conceived those interests to be. Its continued existence is evidence that it has been able to shift with the challenge of the times and fill the needs of the Army. In general terms, its missions are:

- To improve the professional skill and knowledge of every person in the Army.

- To interpret the Army to its individual officers and men.

- To give expression of the needs and desires of individuals in the Army to the Army Department.

- To promote the best interests of the combat arms and to explain them to the rest of the Army and to the public.

- To act as a meeting place for the exchange of ideas and opinions.

- To inform the civilian population of the needs and deeds of the Army and to interpret the Army to those civilians who have enough interest in their Army to dip into the pages of a professional military magazine occasionally.

Two powerful forces have been present to guide the editors and to control the direction of the magazine and association. First are its readers. At any time that a sizable group of them concluded that the magazine no longer held their interest or was failing in its missions, they could drop their support by failing to renew their memberships. When this happens it would be the job of the Executive Council of the Asso-

ciation—its governing body—to change the direction of the editors, or even the editors themselves (perish the thought!). The other power is the power of the Army headquarters officially to frown upon the Association indirectly or to intervene in its affairs directly. The Editor is a retired officer of the Regular Army and several of his assistants are active members of the National Guard or Army Reserve. Also the members of the Executive Council are soldiers of the Regular establishment, the National Guard and the Army Reserve. So the power of the Army officially to intervene in the affairs of the Association is present, if less direct than normal military control.

This power to intervene officially is as it should be. It is this tenuous connection with the official Army that gives this magazine authoritativeness without making the Army responsible for what appears in it. The advantages of this are noted on the contents page each month where you can read that "The **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL** is not the mouthpiece of the Department of Defense. . . ."

THAT sentence says a great deal if you consider it in connection with the relationship we have just described. It means that the Department of Defense (and included in that term when we use it this way is the Department of the Army and its offices, commands and installations) believes in responsible freedom of speech by individual members of the uniformed services. This is, of course, but another expression of the deeply imbedded freedoms we have inherited from our forefathers and from our Eng-

lish origins. The Founding Fathers counted the fear of military dominance among the enemies of freedom and so it is greatly significant that no American soldier has ever violated his freedom to speak to such an extent that the people have found it necessary to forbid responsible free speech to military men. Army Regulations encourage it for they say that "the writing . . . on topics of military or professional interest . . . is authorized and desirable."

Civilians without any government connection may practice free speech with impunity, safe from official action so long as what they write or speak isn't libelous or slanderous. But military men and civilians with government connections have a greater responsibility. Their freedom to speak and write does not entitle them to speak or write so as to embarrass the government, their superiors or subordinates. Because they have official position they must temper the exercise of their freedom to speak or write with responsibility. And we must say that military men have a greater responsibility than mere civilians in government. Responsibility to themselves at least, if not their government. For while civilians can presumably only be fired for speaking unwisely, military men can be court-martialed.

Army Regulations say that all of the writings for publication of military men shall be reviewed for "deletion of classified matter and review for accuracy, propriety, and conformance to policy."

We are not alone in holding some reservations about the wisdom of the regulation as written (but not the thoughts behind it). Security is rarely a prob-

lem. No patriot would want to imperil his country by revealing a fact that might make his country less secure and most of us most of the time will not question the wisdom of the officials charged with determining what should be classified.

So the wisdom of requiring a review for security is unquestionable and is not a problem. Nor is "conformance to policy" when the writer is ostensibly stating policy. But he should be able to state—and we think most soldiers will agree with us—that he thinks the policy ought to be thus or so, so long as he doesn't attack or belittle directly or indirectly the makers of the policy he thinks is wrong.

The wisdom of reviewing for accuracy would seem to be unassailable, but you would be surprised at how "facts" in a controversial question can be red-pencilled with a vigorous, slashing "not so!" in one office and punctuated with an emphatic "and how!" in another. It all depends upon the point of view.

WE come to propriety. What is it? A shorter dictionary gives five definitions, the first and fourth of which are: "conformity to established standards" and "rightness or justness." Obviously the last isn't much good when even accuracy can be debated. Of the first let us say that many books have been written on ethics and the examination of "established standards" in all levels of our society, and just which of several established standards is the correct one no one can say authoritatively. A boss or a commander may say what they are to him and if he is in a position to make his standards stick, they are the guiding ones within the confines of his control. But no farther. And if he is a reasonably intelligent and far-seeing man he may be afflicted with occasional doubts about his ability to determine just what the established standards really are in some lines of conduct. Actually every man has to determine for himself what standards he will live up to and this applies even to military men, for the oath of allegiance of the soldier leaves him a wide latitude of behavior. He can read *From Here to Eternity* from beginning to end, muttering "stinking, inaccurate" but getting something from it none the less, or he can toss it aside after reading a chapter or so because he doesn't believe it suitable for one in his position. He may read it himself but forbid it to his wife—if he is a man rare among men. But when he does that he is exercising his decision on the propriety of the book. Plainly the making of such a decision

is either an overly egotistical or an exceedingly dumb-witted thing to do, or both. In short, propriety is such a nebulous quality or condition that it can't be written into law or regulation so as to get general agreement. Furthermore the soldier who writes or speaks in an unfitting way can be called to book much more easily on other counts in the code of conduct.

WHAT has all this to do with the JOURNAL and its readers? Quite a bit, as a matter of fact. A few months ago we received an article written by a reserve officer that (1) found fault with the Army's concepts of the way it uses motor transportation and suggested a solution; (2) had a fictitious sergeant tell a private who had asked "where are the trucks" that "the officers have got 'em"; and (3) had one or two minor inaccuracies which he later corrected.


We submitted the article for review to the Department of Defense, and they sent it on a slow and involved journey to several staff and technical offices of the Department of the Army and to a large Army headquarters. In time it came back. And with it were not only the various exceptions taken to it, but two long and almost ill-tempered criticisms of it. In short, the offices that took exception to it did so on the grounds of propriety (with the exception of the actual errors which they correctly pointed out). Both critics said that it was wrong for the sergeant to be saying that the "officers had the jeeps," although we doubt if anyone would have the nerve to say that no sergeant had ever said such a thing, or that the comment wasn't applicable to the situation the writer was discussing. One of the critics wrote—and this was in an official letter—that such a comment as that one was meat for the Communists and anything critical of the U. S. Army officer corps was to be shunned for the aid and comfort it gave the enemy. The absurdity of this argument seems obvious. If we are to shut our eyes to our own failures and refuse to admit their existence, the enemy is better served than if officers can openly confess that things could be better and openly suggest improvements. Finally one of the critics declared that the article was "poorly written and organized." This was so clearly out of line—for after all the decision about literary merit is one for the editors and not for staff officers—that the reviewing officials in the Office of Public Information agreed that the officer went beyond his functions in that particular at least. We thought

he had in several others. The upshot was that the article appeared with a washed-out, thin version of its original rich full flavor.

MAYBE this doesn't seem very important or vital, but the principle is very important. If younger officers are to have their serious and carefully thought-out articles criticized in official endorsements by an occasional senior officer who thinks the *status quo* is a bit too radical—they will soon decide that their careers are more important than the few bucks they may get from an article in COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and that the professional credit that they thought would come from their by-lines is nothing but ashes in their mouths.

Our position, as briefly and clearly as we can make it, is this. A magazine article for a service journal or a general publication is not an official staff study that requires "concurrences" up and down the line. It is not the voice of the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff unless their names are on it or it is otherwise identified as such. And it does not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of any part of the Army, but simply the personal views of the writer. It should be cleared for security by a responsible officer. Inaccuracies may be pointed out; that would be helpful to both the writer and the editors. But the reviewing officer should not concern himself with propriety—let the officer suffer the fate that will rightfully befall him if he transgresses the code. The chances are that if it does it wouldn't be accepted by an editor, for editors have standards, too. And these standards can be counted on to protect the Army from the transgressor who might do the Army or the nation real or lasting harm. What slight chance there might remain for undesirable things to be printed under such a policy would be more than offset by the fact that the policy would free the Army from the dubious task of regulating standards of conduct and conformity in the realm of ideas and opinions and save the strain on the hearts of officers whose blood pressure leaps at the sight of an unconventional idea or expression, but who are uncommonly good soldiers and ought to be used as soldiers and not as censors of their colleagues' minds.

We could go on with examples of misguided but honest zeal in the realm of censoring the minds of fellow officers. Actually we have several much more serious examples in mind, but the re-



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 CF-242

sponsibility of editors that we mentioned above impels us not to mention them at this time. We may some day, though.

THERE is one other aspect of the job of editing a service journal that we must get off our chests. Earlier in this piece we spoke of the close relationship that exists between the magazine, its staff, and the Executive Council of its Association, with the official Army. That relationship, properly used, could be of great value to the official Army. Not as a medium for propaganda but as a means to disseminate to the whole Army information that cannot properly be included in official memorandums or directives. That such media are necessary is evidenced by the many mimeographed or multigraphed newsletters produced regularly by various commands and in the official magazine or pamphlet type of publication issued monthly, quarterly, or spasmodically by various offices of the Army and the Department of Defense. Most of these publications have been started since 1945 and they certainly serve a purpose, although every one of them does less than a full job because of the restricted number of copies published and because, since they carry the official "word," they must be edited by concurrence, and thus have little of the vitality of good individual writing and expert editing. There are notable exceptions, to be sure; so notable in fact as to prove the case for mediocrity that can be made against the average run of them.

The COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL could not possibly be substituted for all those publications. We don't have the space and if we tried to do this, the CFJ would no longer be the magazine you are accustomed to and like. But we do believe that the Army could make fuller use of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL than it does. It could, for example, help the editors prepare articles that would launch valid Army views into the realm of discussion. A case in point was General Bradley's article two and one-half years ago on "U. S. Military Policy." This important article was published in *The Reader's Digest* simultaneously with our publication. *Reader's Digest* has more than a hundred times the circulation of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL but General Bradley asked us if we would publish it at the same time because he wanted his fellow soldiers to read it. A similar use of CFJ was General Collins's article on small-unit tactics a few months ago.

The advantage to the Army of the publication of such important articles

in this magazine is obvious. But there is much more we could do—with some official cooperation. And we have on our desk right now a splendid example of how the failure of one section of an Army department to cooperate with us turned out to be a disservice to the Army.

YOU may recall that a few months ago the Johnson Preparedness Subcommittee published a report on wastage of manpower in the services and made some palpably uninformed criticism of the infantry battalion. Even uninformed criticism can only be answered with informed facts, so one of our staff went to the Pentagon to see if he could dig up a few facts to buttress what we already knew to answer the criticism. We found an officer who knew his stuff and who had at his disposal a staff study of the fire power of the infantry battalion and an analysis of its manpower requirements. At least he said he had such a document. He didn't let us see it, nor would he let us see his "own" article written for publication, he said, "in a national magazine." Our staff member protested that all the CFJ wanted to do was to help the Army refute an uninformed attack, but it got no help from that officer, who after a phone call disappeared from his office for five minutes, then returned to say that his superiors agreed with him that it wasn't possible to help us. A day or so later the Department of Defense distributed a "fact sheet" on the fire power of the infantry division for the press, and armed with that and the knowledge and experience of the editorial staff, we editorialized a bit on the subject and pointed out some of the errors and misconceptions in the report.

That was several months ago . . . before Thanksgiving or earlier. But early in March an official Army publication appeared with the article "written for a national magazine" in it. That Army publication may be "national" in a certain sense of the word but not in the sense normally associated with it. Nor is its circulation—distribution is the correct word—"mass" even in the Army.

ALL this sounds like a massive gripe. And that it may be. But the mental health experts tell us that release of pent-up complaints is the beginning of a return to normal spirits. So the editors feel better and maybe you have found something of value in all of this. For it is your magazine and our problems are yours, if you want to help us shoulder them.

PUT 'EM ON TRACKS

Only tracked logistical vehicles will give armor true mobility

Major Lamar McFadden Prosser

NOT since the taxicab movement in the First World War had there been a more dramatic logistical novelty than the Red Ball Express in 1944. It was monotonous but it was magnificent! Over more than 400 miles of roadway, across the breadth of France, trucks in continuous cycle, lifted eight thousand tons of supplies a day. From the congested dumps of Normandy, through villages already weary of liberation, seven thousand trucks pounded endlessly towards the Allied armies whose offensive power was being slowly strangled just as they reached the hastily manned defenses of the Reich itself. Our armies had made unprecedented gains since the breakout at St. Lô and now unprecedented logistical efforts were required to supply those armies.

Four infantry divisions were grounded in Normandy while their organic transportation and drivers were shuttled into the Red Ball Express. Four complete divisions as effectively neutralized as if by enemy action. "All along the front," wrote General Eisenhower, "the cry was for more gasoline and more ammunition. Nevertheless, we had to supply each force for its basic mission and for its basic mission only." In spite of the most heroic efforts, the Red Ball was able to provide the combat units with only the minimum essential supplies. For lack of gas our armor was paralyzed at perhaps the most crucial moment of the entire campaign.

There is something so exciting about this valorously improvised supply operation that it is in danger of becoming a legend complete with all the inaccuracies of a folk-tale. We are already beginning to forget that it was really an expedient that failed. We have every right to be proud of it as a demonstration of American adaptability and talent for improvisation, but we have no right to assume that it can ever be repeated. The truth is that

motorized divisions and motorized supply columns were obsolete when we invaded France. Only our strength in the air made their activities possible. If the enemy had had any considerable air power, not only the Red Ball Express but many of our tactical movements would have been impossible. Our enemy, who certainly had had the experience to make mobile warfare work, found such mobility impossible with his truck- and cart-supplied army when we dominated the skies above him. Wheeled vehicles could no longer provide the mobility required by the conditions of 1944. Neither the German Army, on the defensive, nor the Allied Forces, pressing the attack, found wheeled transport adequate for the job during that last winter of the war.

This inadequacy had been predicted in the 1930s when Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and Major General J. F. C. Fuller had each, separately, come to the conclusion that the tank, to which the new mobility was tied, would never produce its full effect until the other arms and services upon which the tank must depend were brought up to the tank's standard of speed and cross-country performance. What was visualized in 1930 was an armored division which would carry with it its own supporting arms and supply services in order to permit it to fight free of the restrictions imposed by roads. Armored forces thus organized, they reasoned, would be capable of breaking through the brittle crust of position defenses and, once pierced, these defenses would be shattered by violent exploitation in the enemy's vulnerable rear areas. The success of this form of combat depended on mobility more than sheer weight of mass. These ideas were only gradually and only partially accepted. So novel was this concept of the tactical use of mobility, however, that for three years the German Army had considerable success, although only partly tracked. Its successes were due as much to shock and the paralyzing effect of the unexpected as to the strength of their army.

The easy victories of this period obscured from

MAJOR LAMAR MCFADDEN PROSSER, Armor, enlisted in the Army in 1939, was commissioned in 1942, and integrated into the Regular Army in 1946.



all but the most acute observers the fatal flaws in the basic organizations. It became apparent to all, though, when the wheeled vehicles of the support and supply elements of the German armies bogged down in the trackless Ukraine.

Much had happened in those first three years of the war and by the fall of 1944 the inherent weaknesses of armored organizations nullified their offensive power. An armored division was not mobile as long as it was dependent upon transport vehicles that could not leave the roads. The tracked armored dog was being wagged by its wheeled tail.

The Allied Forces, enjoying freedom of the air, were able to make-do by such strenuous efforts as the Red Ball Express and so escaped some of the consequences of having grafted the legs of a dachshund on to the body of a bulldog. The war boomed on for many more months because the mobile fighting forces were tethered to the beachhead depots by supply elements that could be no more flexible than the road net.

OUR failure to develop full cross-country trafficability (and it was even then completely possible) has led to some serious misconceptions being incorporated into our postwar army. Among these none is of more fundamental importance than the perpetuation of our dependence upon wheels for supply. If there is one feature of the last war which has been forever swept away into history, it is those long convoys of wheeled vehicles jamming every road in France. If anything is certain in this uncertain world, it is the fact that certain defeat awaits the force that depends upon the 2½-ton truck for the movement of its armies.

The tremendous advantages we should gain if all the transport vehicles of the Army were tracked, surely must be apparent. Supply formations and units in transit could leave the roads and maneuver forward if the situation demanded, taking full advantage of the cover and concealment provided by the terrain, could even fight their way if necessary. Our ability to maintain units in the field would no longer be held to the capacity of the existing highway system. Streetcars have given way to buses in all urban communities because the old tramlines were not flexible enough to meet the demands of life in a modern city. The 2½-ton, 6 x 6, must also give way to a vehicle of more dependable cross-country traction. This is true not only because of the difficult supply problem but because we will not fight under 1944-45 conditions again.

The mass-destruction weapons and the many unique methods of delivering these weapons have placed the accent on protective dispersion. Large bodies of troops cannot now be shifted about as in the past. Probably our potential enemies would control the air (at least initially) and we should likewise meet them on the ground outnumbered and outgunned. We need not be dismayed by these facts for if we correctly estimate the present potentials we shall find the strength and the tactics to meet them. It is essential, though, that we recognize these truths and accept them and that we work out our blueprint for the future in terms of the probable conditions which will exist if war comes. Since we plainly cannot use our present overgrown divisions effectively while the enemy controls the air, we must work with smaller tactical units.

THE least alarming feature at this moment is the size of the armies that could be brought against us. For as a boxer finds excess weight a disadvantage, so an army finds mere numbers a handicap. This is particularly true today when large concentrations must be avoided, above all. I hazard the opinion that knowledge that his mass is no longer decisive, deters our potential enemy more than the fear of our new weapons.

If our army were organized into smaller combat groups and mounted in tracked vehicles for greater freedom of movement, it would be possible to practice the Liddell Hart theory of "fluidity of force" and "controlled dispersion." Not just a chain of strongpoints with a mobile reserve but a chain mail of completely mobile forces deployed in great depth. The separate units might, if the enemy attacked in force, hold their positions as islands of resistance, harassing the enemies' flanks and rear after being by-passed. The brave units that did this during the Germans' Ardennes offensive, though individually weak, caused the enemy to change the direction of his attack and by doing so to lose much momentum and the advantage his strategic surprise gave him. The Germans used the system to some extent in Russia and elsewhere so there is already a body of historical experience to form the basis of this technique.

Under certain other conditions the individual combat group might give up its strongpoint in the face of the enemy attack, allowing the enemy to strike a vacuum into which he would be sucked worthlessly. He then would be hit in the flanks of the created salient.

Such a mesh of strongpoints would

offer an unremunerative target for costly weapons of destruction and yet it would be difficult for the enemy to overcome each individually. Protective dispersion on the ground must be combined with the capability for rapid maneuver and local concentration for offensive action, should the tactical and the air situation permit. This is a tailor-made role for armor. Such speedy, fluid movements are only possible in tracks.

To distribute mobile combat teams in such a fluid manner is opposite of dividing a tank company into platoons to support foot-powered infantry. Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin was pointing the way when he suggested that the "specialized divisions—infantry, armored, airborne—will tend to merge into combined arms combat teams, a variable number of which could be combined under a corps headquarters for tactical direction."

The logical sequence of events, the steady acceleration of transportation in our civilization, the gradual but constant evolution towards greater mobility—all suggest that the ground forces will eventually be organized into mounted combined arms teams of somewhat less than present division size. No branch will disappear, none will be subordinated, each will complement the other. If we can achieve this amalgamation we shall be able to prove that we have not yet begun to fight. The opportunities are enormous.

One by-product of this shrinkage of the size of the combat unit would be an economy of force, a saving in manpower that would partly redress the enemy preponderance of numbers. It should be unnecessary to hold out reserves at each echelon of command as insurance against calamity, for all units, mobile and deployed in depth, could be maneuvered on the field to meet the lunges of the foe or to capitalize on any local success we may obtain. Let our enemy attempt to use his masses and he becomes enmeshed in the loose net of our defense and a target for our "fantastic weapons." It is just such a concentration of force that represents the greatest danger in modern war. To force the enemy to mass will be the highest art of generalship.

THESE tactical ideas are practical with the vehicles we now have, with one hamstringing exception—the 6 x 6. It must be replaced by a tracked vehicle. If all our combat elements travel and fight in tracked vehicles and are employed in a fluid manner, it would be a compounded folly to attempt to supply



them over the roads. The location, direction, capacity and extent of the road system in a given locality is very largely a matter of accident, and, while military operations have been largely contained and confined by existing roads, I submit that this is, or should be, no longer true. We cannot accept such arbitrary, circumstantial restrictions. To expand upon the mobility of railroads we added trucks, and since further expansion of our basic mobility is now a paramount necessity, we must get on tracks. Roads are dangerous for any military purpose. Experience indicates (though, perhaps we have not yet learned the lesson) that ground operations against a modern, well-equipped enemy are no longer possible without the flexibility of a tracked vehicle. It would be a mistake simply to modify the chassis of a tank for infantry and supply uses. What is needed is a lighter vehicle with carrying capacity, excellent cross-country characteristics, high ground clearance and low silhouette. Certainly our present transportation is not the best our mechanized society can do towards achieving the cross-country trafficability we must have. The development of a suitable logistical vehicle is fundamentally important to our national defense no matter where we eventually fight and it must be given the highest priority.

A great deal has been written about air supply. It is, of course, one possible alternative to overland logistics. It is not a cure-all. Air supply will always be dependent upon the establishment and maintenance of control of the air above the fighting front. Since this is assuredly problematical, so is air supply of tactical units. Our accomplishments in this field, like so many other pleasant but dangerous military habits we have formed, were only possible while the

skies belonged to us. Furthermore, we must remember, weather is still an important factor in air operations.

Despite the serious imponderables that affect air supply, the new weapons that may appear may well force us to use it for long distance movement of supplies. Can anyone believe that those tremendous supply dumps and theater depots bulging with every conceivable commodity will again appear? No. They are too enticing a target. They were practical in Europe only because the German air power had been virtually destroyed before the land battle began. Today they are unthinkable. Some of them will, of course, simply go underground. But it stretches the imagination to think that atomic bomb-proof underground warehouses could be successively constructed behind the front as it moved forward. We might be forced to accept the insecurity of air supply to avoid other less desirable features of stockpiling in the traditional way. A system of air supply from underground bases in the zone of the interior direct to underground supply points in the field might evolve. Fighter aircraft operating from the bases in the theater of operations would rendezvous with the aerial convoy at the extreme range of the fighters and escort them to the supply points. The enemy would naturally attempt to disrupt these supply operations as often and as much as possible. His raids against our air convoys would correspond to the submarines the Germans used against Allied sea convoys. We defeated the submarine and we will have to meet and overcome the enemy's harassment from the air.

If there is any glory in this profession of ours it should go to the soldier who meets the foe sustained only by his rifle

and his guts. But the soldier's honor is in no way diminished by being transported in a tracked vehicle until his rifle and his guts can be effective. The cavalry fought mechanization long after its position became outdated. In the end there was little left of its argument except sentiment. In the present tendency to glorify the infantryman because he walks to his work there is a lot of sentiment, too. The practice of transporting infantry on tanks is an accepted technique of battle. It is a short step from riding on a tank to riding in an armored foxhole.

Between armor and infantry there should be no quarrel. Some of us in armor think that the addition of tanks to the infantry division was a mistake because it increased the size of an already overgrown organization, but we will be the first to hail it as the beginning of the merger of all arms. The development of self-propelled artillery is constantly progressing and many are convinced that it is the logical supporting weapon in this motor age. We await only the development of a dependable cross-country vehicle for the infantry and our supply elements so that we can get off the roads and fight. The increasing power of weapons and their ability to kill at a distance have constantly forced on us tactics that are more flexible, loose and open and entail more isolation of units and individuals. This has now reached the point that men must be mounted to achieve it.

This is no time for pessimism and branch patriotism. This is a time of dynamic change and great exploration. We are on the edge of vital development, and the mutation of the ground forces is going to be as decisive as any new weapon in the arsenal—in the long run, perhaps more so.

★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Military Judges

General court-martial under the 1951 manual reduces the court itself to the status of a civilian jury with the important exception that the court, unlike a civilian jury, must sentence the accused if it finds him guilty. This makes careful selection of court members mandatory. Most of them are commissioned and many of them are very senior. Accordingly we find that an excessively large proportion of the time of many officers is taken up with courts where, as a captive audience, they sit silently and helplessly for long hours while the law officer, trial counsel and defense counsel argue loftily over fine points of the law.

It seems to me that having been driven this far from the old system—which had many merits, if some weaknesses—we should be better off if we went whole hog and had military judges to preside over all cases now coming to trial before general and special courts. Military judges should be chosen and appointed from capable senior colonels whose judicial appointment would be terminated only by retirement or for the convenience of the government. Judges so selected should be sent to school for a while—not to qualify them as full-fledged lawyers, but to enable them to preside over a general court-martial with the benefit of a law officer, and to conduct a special court without assistance.

The military judge should have the powers of sentence in a general court, and should perform in solitary legal grandeur all the duties now carried on by the members of a special court.

Such a system should have many advantages, the most important of which are these:

(1) Courts (juries) might be made smaller: perhaps six for a general, and of course none for a special court-martial.

(2) Courts (juries) might be composed of less senior officers and include, perhaps, fifty per cent noncommissioned officers. There would be no requirement that court members be senior to the accused—an awful nuisance.

(The net result of these two sugges-

tions would be far less time spent on courts by line officers, who have much too much administrative work to do these days.)

(3) Justice should be more uniform and improper sentences very rare. After all, each finding and sentence would be made part of the judge's record, and if his record did not show good judgment, he could be fired.

(4) Court time should be lessened—after the general court (jury) brought in its findings, it could go home, thus eliminating the sometimes lengthy procedure of determining sentence.

(5) Justice should be somewhat more prompt, for smaller courts are more easily assembled.

I think this is a wonderful idea: Office of The Judge Advocate General please copy.

BRIG. GEN. HAMILTON H. HOWZE

Party Line?

The discretion observed by the well-mannered when using a party line in rural communities could well be extended to wire communication in combat areas. In most cases proper security measures are observed when radio is used to transmit messages. But how many of us consider a telephone conversation similarly subject to enemy interception?

Interviews with artillery and infantry communications officers who served in Korea during the period November 1950 to September 1952 reflect the probability that wire-tapping is one of the routine methods of intelligence gathering used by the enemy. Tapping occurred at various levels in our wire system, ranging from infantry combat outposts to corps artillery headquarters lines. The

technique varied with the situation. A common practice was to splice into one of our lines and lead a wire into a nearby Korean house for listening. Other lines were monitored only during the night and with dawn the listeners found a safe refuge in which to rest for the next night's tapping. Three methods of tapping were reported: putting clips on our wire, tapping into a terminal box, and splicing into a line.

A corps artillery communications officer told of an incident in which he found Chinese issue field wire leading from a T-splice on one of his lines to the top of a nearby ridge. Litter found at the ridge position indicated that it had been occupied for several days. The officer then tapped wires in the same location and heard staff officers discussing future operations in clear text. The few wire tappers we have captured spoke fluent English.

Discovery of skinned wires and observation of temporarily lowered voltages are good indications that wire tapping is being conducted in the area.

Throughout history the outcome of battles has often been determined by complete and accurate intelligence. No one would willingly contribute to the success of the enemy's intelligence gathering agencies. Department of the Army directives state clearly that field wire circuits are not to be used for classified clear text messages except in emergencies. Only the commander may authorize such a transmission. Although all too rarely used, codes and ciphers are prescribed for use with the telephone. Think before you speak. The pictures adorning Stateside walls of the little men with big ears are more accurate than comical. Communications security is everyone's job every time he picks up a telephone.

CAPTAIN CAUTIOUS

Adjutants for the FA

During 1952 the Department of the Army published and distributed several new TO&Es. In general, these contained only minor changes that reflected current policies of the various arms and services with an over-all aim of making reductions in strength wherever possible without sacrificing efficiency.

One of the first of the new series to be distributed was 6-126, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, Field Artillery Battalion (105mm howitzer, towed). Changes included reductions in orderlies and food service personnel which will not materially affect the functioning of the battery. However, the reductions



also included the loss of one captain, the S1-Adjutant. The duties that were previously performed by this officer are to be handled by the battalion executive officer.

Field artillerymen reluctantly accepted the loss of the S1-Adjutant as a part of an Army-wide program to reduce manpower requirements. There were many skeptics among officers who had served in field artillery battalions during World War II and had faced the problem of operating an administrative headquarters without an authorized S1-Adjutant. They remembered that most battalion commanders found it necessary to detail some officer of the unit to act as S1-Adjutant if they expected to receive the normal assistance from their executive officer. Many battalions selected a liaison officer for this duty. This solution solved the administrative problem but created another—an untrained liaison officer and liaison section.

As subsequent TO&Es were received and checked (including the tables for other field artillery battalions that lost the S1-Adjutant) field artillerymen were surprised to note that antiaircraft artillery battalions, armored battalions, technical service units, and the infantry battalion, didn't lose their S1-Adjutant.

What is there about a field artillery battalion that makes it differ from all other units of battalion size; that allows it to function efficiently without an authorized S1-Adjutant? The answer seems to be that there is nothing peculiar about its organization that will permit the battalion executive to perform the duties of two staff officers. The most striking comparison might be made with the infantry battalion. The infantry battalion is an interior battalion and is not an administrative headquarters; yet there is an executive and an S1-Adjutant authorized for it. A similar comparison might be made in regard to the division artillery headquarters and headquarters battery TO&E. This unit is usually referred to as a tactical unit yet it has an authorized S1-Adjutant.

Aren't executive officer's duties very similar regardless of the type of unit? Obviously yes, except that in the field artillery the executive has more responsibility than he has in infantry or armored units because he has a more active role in the tactical displacement of his unit and has definite responsibility for coordinating the local security of the batteries of the battalion.

In garrison during the training period this problem can be solved by detailing some officer to perform the duty of S1-



Adjutant in addition to his regular duty. This means sacrificing the training of this officer in his table of organization duties. In the field there appears to be no solution. Each officer authorized by the TO&E has definite full-time duties. It is difficult to see how the battalion executive can satisfactorily perform his executive duties during combat and attempt to handle correspondence of the battalion, courts-martial proceedings, rotation and leave policies, and other miscellaneous S1-Adjutant functions.

There has been an increase in the amount of unit administration and this places an additional burden on field artillery battalion commanders. We have increased the responsibilities of the FA battalion commander and at the same time we have deprived him of the staff officer who could assume responsibility for certain administrative functions.

The TO&Es for field artillery battalions should be revised to include the authorization of the S1-Adjutant. The postwar conferences and studies on organization of the Army clearly indicated that the officer personnel authorized by the field artillery TO&Es published in the late 1940s were all justified. Nothing revealed in the Korean war indicates that the adjutant of the field artillery battalion is not needed.

COL. CHARLES W. HENRY
Artillery

Fire Support Coordination

How to coordinate all means of fire support at the regimental level has been debated for the past several years. Various solutions have been developed, tried, and accepted, but the solution will never be developed until the necessary personnel and equipment are furnished the fire support coordinator by TO&E rather than by improvisation.

Today's doctrine designates the direct-support artillery battalion commander as the regimental fire support coordinator. This is because the field artillery

is now, and will be for years to come, the principal means of fire support for the regiment during normal ground operations. Currently the direct-support battalion commander must rob his battalion of valuable staff personnel to organize and operate the fire support coordination center when this installation is separated from the battalion fire direction center. Such action lowers the efficiency of the field artillery battalion and actually tends to slow up evaluation and attack of potential targets.

Why don't we give the regimental commander a permanent fire support section as a part of his own organization? This section should be headed by a field artillery officer (major, MOS 1193) trained for fire support coordination and assigned to the infantry regiment. His section should include an operations sergeant, a clerk-typist, and radio-telephone operators to man sufficient radio equipment for communication with all fire support agencies. Liaison officers from these fire support agencies would make up the rest of the fire support coordination center crew. These officers would take an active part in the evaluation of all targets and would also perform such additional duties as would be necessary for the smooth operation of the FSCC. In the field or in combat the FSCC would be located adjacent to the regimental operations and intelligence section or it would operate as a part of that section. As long as the artillery provides most of the fire support, the coordinator should be an artilleryman.

Another solution, more in line with the current doctrine, would be for the fire support coordination section to be an integral part of the FA direct support battalion. This would require that each direct support battalion's TO&E be increased to provide the necessary personnel and equipment. Even though they were assigned to the direct support battalion they would still operate at the CP of the supported infantry regiment.

The addition of the fire support coordination section would enable the artillery battalion commander to devote his time to commanding his battalion instead of coordinating regimental fire support as dictated by today's doctrine. The commander's leadership and experience are needed by his battalion. The infantry would be satisfied because the FSCC would always be located at the regimental CP. The artillery would be satisfied because artillery "know-how" would be used to coordinate all fire support agencies.

CAPT. ROBERT T. TOWNSEND
Artillery

FRONT AND CENTER

Lose anything in the last 13 years? If you did and if the government is responsible you have until 3 July to put in your claim. The Army announces that all personal property losses sustained since 7 December 1939 by soldiers or civilian employees of the Army must be submitted no later than that date, or within two years of the loss. If you put in a claim before 1952 that was turned down by the then existing statutes of limitations, you may be able to collect if you resubmit it. The law was amended last year. No matter what you claim you lost, even a gold brick, you can't collect more than \$2,500.

Some students of the Congress have believed that military service has a marked influence on a Congressman's approach to military and naval legislation, and if that is true these figures of the service of members of the present Senate and House may have some significance: 21 of the 96 members of the Senate have been officers in the service and 105 of the 435 members of the House. It figures out to about 24%. The breakdown by service shows:

	Senate	House
Army	10	47
Navy	5	42
Air Force	3	10
Marine Corps	3	6

Army Field Forces is encouraging all Army commands to conduct annual rifle and pistol matches at which the best shots can be selected to compete for berths on the All-Army rifle and pistol squads. AFF suggests the program start at the platoon level and that battalion, regimental and divisional teams be formed for possible competition in the annual national championships. The 1953 national matches will be at Camp Perry, Ohio, and sponsored, as usual, by the National Rifle Association.

Inconsistencies and inequities in laws that make it possible for the widows of reserve officers to receive total death benefits many times greater than those received by the widows of regular officers have been under study in the Pentagon and one plan for equilization has been worked out and may be submitted

to Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah for possible recommendation to Congress. This new plan would continue the six months' death gratuity but raise the minimum gratuity to \$1,200 and lower the maximum to \$3,000. At present the widow of a recruit receives \$468 and the widow of a flying general with 30 years of service \$6,857. Monthly benefits would be paid to a widow until she remarries or dies, based on the basic pay of her deceased husband. She would get 80% of the first \$100 of pay plus 40% of the balance (minimum monthly payment would be \$100). All members of the service would be put into Social Security. Finally, benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act would be discontinued. This is the area where widows of reservists are better off than the widows of regulars: reservists are under FECA while regulars are under the Veterans Administration.

When you change your overseas World War II and Korea service bars to your right sleeve in conformance with the new directive, it's because G1, knowing it would have to do something to relieve the load on the left sleeve of master sergeants and sergeants first class, decided that was the best remedy. It could have devised a silver bar to replace say five of the gold bars or something of that order, but a look at the government's present inventory of gold bars made it decide to relieve the taxpayers of the cost of a new bar, and let the individual soldier hire a tailor—or do his own. World War I overseas bars are not affected because they are of the same design as wound stripes awarded in that war which are worn on the right sleeve. While World I wounded can substitute the Purple Heart for the wound stripe, many of them prefer the stripe and have never applied for the decoration. And the Department has never seen fit to direct that all World War I wounded turn in their wound stripes for the Purple Hearts.

The glowing promises inherent in the postwar plans for Regular Army enlisted men failed to materialize through no fault of the Army command. Congressional and Budget Bureau restric-

tions on pay and promotion and the Korean conflict—largely the latter—are the cause of the alarming low rate of reenlistment of noncommissioned officers. Stabilized tours of duty, family housing, and the easing of promotion restrictions are probably the three most important improvements that can be made. The Army is making a serious effort to put them across.

A bill to award every Medal of Honor winner with a life pension of \$250 a month and a certificate which would show why the medal was awarded has been introduced in the Congress. It also provides for an "Armed Forces Medal of Honor Roll."

The growth of Army Aviation can be discerned in the redesignation of the Air Training Department of the Artillery School, Fort Sill, to the Army Aviation School, although the official explanation is that it would "facilitate administration."

AAS will be supervised and directed by Army Field Forces, through the CG, Fourth Army. It will continue the work of the Artillery School's ATD in training officers and men of all branches in Army Aviation tactics and advanced flight training, including instrument flying. Basic technical training of both light plane and helicopter pilots is performed by the Air Force at its San Marcos, Texas, base.

Little can be done under present laws to stop the making and selling of fraudulent service ribbons and other uniform gadgets being palmed off on U. S. soldiers returning from both the Far East and Europe, but the Army is warning its men that wearers of unauthorized ribbons or badges are liable to fines and jail sentences. Among the fraudulent ribbons are a NATO ribbon sold to men who have served in Europe, combat badges and shoulder cords for members of arms other than infantry and medics. The obvious corrective is the one the Army is taking: to instruct all men in what ribbons, badges and other devices they can wear, how they are earned, and their significance. Congress could help by making it illegal to manufacture or sell phony ribbons.

FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Psychological Survey

A survey team headed by Dr. Richard Walk of the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, is studying the psychological causes of attrition among airborne students. The Human Resources Research Office, which is under contract to the Department of Army, also studies motivation, morale and leadership, training methods, and psychological warfare for the Army.

The group is testing the relationship between the different orientations given airborne students at the beginning of their course and the "washout" rate. Of particular interest to the researchers is the reaction of students to these different orientations.

Patterson Award

Second Lieutenant Herbert T. Perrin, Jr., who graduated from the Infantry Officer Candidate Course in May 1952, was the first winner of the Robert P. Patterson Memorial Award.

This award is given annually to the graduate of the Infantry OCS who distinguishes himself by demonstrating outstanding qualities of leadership, academic efficiency, aptitude and character while attending OCS.

The award honors the late Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, who won the DSC as an infantry captain in France in 1918. The award consists of an engraved trophy, scroll and cash.

Airborne Military Police

Fort Benning recently became the second post in the United States to have airborne military police. Some 45 paratroopers from the 508th Airborne Regimental Combat Team are on duty with the 3440th Military Police detachment.

Mine Warfare

Mine warfare instruction in all courses conducted at TIS will be increased in accordance with a recent OCAFF directive.

All courses at The Infantry School now include four hours of instruction on this subject. Under the new policy, the Infantry Officer Advanced course will include 12 hours; the Associate Infantry Officer Advanced course and the Infantry Intelligence & Reconnaissance Chiefs course will be increased to eight hours; and all Associate Infantry Company Officer, Infantry Officer Candidate School and non-commissioned officer courses will have 16 hours.

The additional instruction will stress the

new policies governing mine warfare, the personnel authorized to lay mines, types of mine fields, and the correct techniques for marking, recording and reporting them.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Cartridge Case for 105mm How

A new cartridge case, called the spiral wrapped cartridge case, designed to replace the costly brass case now in use, has been developed by the Ordnance Corps for the 105mm howitzer.

The new case is formed by coiling a trapezoidal sheet of steel and holding it together by spot welding. The case is bolted to a steel base. When fired, the case expands against the wall of the chamber, breaking the spot welding and providing an effective gas seal.

The Department of Gunnery, TAS, has received nearly 10,000 rounds of ammunition, with the new case, for test. About half of this amount has been fired, and early reports indicate that its performance compares favorably with the brass case. There have been very few instances of the case sticking in the chamber after firing or of excessive gas leakage around the breech.

Publications

TM 6-200, Artillery Survey, a new technical manual covering the techniques of artillery survey, is now being prepared at TAS. It will deal with the survey of all artillery, including guided missiles.

The survey portion of **FM 6-40, Field Artillery Gunnery** is being eliminated in the revised manual presently under preparation by the Department of Training Publications and Aids.

Draft copies of revised **FM 6-20, Artillery Tactics and Technique**, have gone out to reviewing agencies. The revised manual contains detailed information on target intelligence and analysis. It covers doctrine on fire support coordination and the tactical employment of antiaircraft artillery in the combat zone in addition to revising material in the present manual.

Mine Warfare

Reports from Korea indicate that our troops are not sufficiently aware of the role of mine warfare, particularly in the offense. Accordingly TAS has incorporated instruction in mine warfare in all courses, both officer and enlisted. The instruction in mine warfare will be conducted jointly by the Departments of Matériel and Combined Arms, and will include familiarization with U. S. and foreign mines, tactical employment of mines, and clearing of enemy mine fields.

Foreign Armies

Recognizing that an officer is not fully prepared for combat unless he knows both his friends and foes, TAS is now giving a brief orientation course on foreign armies. All officers' courses include this training, with the amount and scope varying with the length and level of each course. In view of the brief time available, instruction is limited to salient points of organization, tactics, and technique, and emphasis is placed on those armies that officers are most likely to come in contact with in event of war.

Armored Artillery T/O&Es

A new series of T/O&Es covering armored artillery has been published recently. These tables superseded the old T/O&Es on 8 March 1953.

- 6-300 —Division Artillery, Armored Division (8 Sep 52)
- 6-301A—Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, Armored Division (8 Sep 52)
- 6-315 —Field Artillery Battalion, 105mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored (8 Sep 52)
- 6-316 —Hq and Hq Battery, Field Artillery, 105mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored (8 Sep 52)
- 6-317 —FA Battery, 105mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored or Howitzer Company, Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion (8 Sep 52)
- 6-319 —Service Battery, FA Battalion, 105mm Howitzer and 155mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored (8 Sep 52)
- 6-325 —FA Battalion, 155mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored (8 Sep 52)
- 6-326 —Hq and Hq Battery, FA Battalion, 155mm Howitzer, Self-Propelled, Armored (8 Sep 52)

Dipstick Adjustment

In the December 1952 COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL it was indicated that the "dipstick" of the GMC 2½-ton truck M-135 was located in such a position that it could strike the battery terminal when withdrawn, causing a possible short circuit. The manufacturer has pointed out that the prescribed adjustment of the position of the engine oil dipstick guide tube will provide sufficient clearance to allow the engine oil dipstick to be removed from the engine without interference. The adjustment is made by loosening the retaining nut at the base of the guide tube, positioning the guide tube properly, and retightening the retaining nut.

★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

THE VANISHING FRONTIER CLOSES A GOLDEN AGE

THE GREAT FRONTIER. By Walter Prescott Webb. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952. 434 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

THE NEXT MILLION YEARS. By Charles Galton Darwin. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1953. 210 Pages; Index; \$2.75.

We Americans are proud of the democracy that we have achieved. We hail our standard of living as the highest on earth. We generously seek to export both democracy and wealth to help our allies. It rarely occurs to us to ask how we reached this point in human history or how much farther we shall be able to go. We fancy that progress is inevitable, that our own progress was due chiefly to our extraordinary merits as a people. These two books may cause us to revise our opinions.

These writings of an eminent American historian and a distinguished British physicist have this theme in common: Professor Webb and Sir Charles Darwin both look on the present as the end of an abnormal period of history. The professor from Texas holds that the influence of the great frontier, opened by Columbus and later explorers, has pervaded our modern culture and has been responsible for our great material prosperity and our democratic institutions. The more than four centuries since Columbus discovered America have seen the greatest boom in history. But since vacant land is no longer available and since we have consumed so much of our wealth, the end of the boom is in sight.

Similarly, the grandson of the author of *Origin of Species* believes that the recent centuries have been "the greatest of Golden Ages." He attributes this abnormal era of wealth and progress not only to the frontier but also to the scientific revolution that has enabled man to control Nature and modify his environment.

Both authors make bleak forecasts of things to come, but neither author is a defeatist. I like the way both suggest a constructive attitude toward their somber predictions. Professor Webb says:

The question before us now is whether we can manage what we have so eagerly taken. That is our challenge and our opportunity. We should not be so obtuse as to believe that the means of management are the same as those of conquest, or that frontier institutions will necessarily serve a metropolitan society. Our challenge consists in finding out what modifications should be made, and our opportunity will come in making them.

Sir Charles, likewise, believes that by taking thought we can do something about the difficulties that lie ahead:

If the world is inevitably to be so much more dreadful a place than current thought expects, would it not perhaps be better to forget the fact and simply go on hoping? I do not think

so; if we are living in a fool's paradise, it is surely better to know the fact. But the matter goes further than this; for we certainly can do something to control the world around us, and if we can appreciate the limits of what is possible, we may have some hope of achieving our aims, whereas if our aims are outside possibility, then we are doomed to failure. Therefore it is a practically important thing to see clearly any laws which must set absolute limits to what it is possible to do.

Sir Charles bases his hypothesis on the physical and biological laws of Nature and reaches his conclusions not by the cause and effect relation, but by the laws of probability.

Professor Webb is deeply indebted to an earlier American historian who, three score years ago, enriched and stimulated American historical thought with a new hypothesis. Frederick Jackson Turner advanced the thesis that the frontier, more than any other influence, had shaped our civilization, and concluded his essay with these words: "And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of one hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history."

While Turner was interested primarily in the influence of the American frontier on American history, he wrote that our Atlantic Coast was "the frontier of Europe in a very real sense." Professor Webb unfolds this thesis in fascinating detail and goes much further in the frontier theory than Turner. He examines the results of the discovery of North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. These new lands, sparsely populated and therefore available to the peoples of Western Europe, created a frontier for Western Europe that was in fact the greatest frontier in the history of the world. It determined the course of history and modified the institutions of modern Europe just as much as it shaped American history. The growing freedom of the individual in America from Old World traditions and restrictions inevitably influenced European thought and progress, but Professor Webb is chiefly concerned with what happened in American history, and what is likely to happen in the immediate future.

The result of this great increase in land and physical resources available to the Western World was a boom that has lasted for more than four hundred years, or as long as the frontier remained. The significance of this idea is tremendous. Professor Webb writes that:

The boom hypothesis has implications that are far-reaching and important. It means that the modern age was an abnormal age, and not a progressive orderly development which mankind

was destined to make anyway. It means that the institutions developed in this exceptional period are exceptional institutions, something out of the ordinary, and something quite different from what might be expected in the course of human affairs. They and their attendant ideas about human beings, government, and economics are very highly specialized to meet boom conditions, and may be expected to undergo much change when these conditions have passed away and history returns to normal. It is too early to guess what the changes will be, for the boom is not yet quite over everywhere, but the end of it is near enough to promote tendencies which give some hint of tomorrow.

The boom theory is easier to understand when we consider a few figures. The people of Western Europe in 1500 were so crowded that there were only "24 acres of land, good or bad, for each individual." The discovery of the Americas and other lands which Webb includes in the frontier suddenly made available to each individual 148 acres instead of 24. The boom continued as long as public lands could be distributed, but in the first quarter of this present century they practically disappeared. Furthermore, by 1930 the density of population throughout Western Europe and in the one-time frontier exceeded the density in Europe in 1500, and, so says Professor Webb, the Age of the Frontier is already over.

Is there any substitute for the former frontier in order that the boom may continue? The exploitation of the Amazon Valley and Africa offers serious obstacles that would have to be overcome at extremely high cost. The new frontiers of science and technology are often suggested as substitutes for the land frontier, but Professor Webb thinks their potential easily exaggerated. These are hard facts, but wisdom consists in recognizing the problems created by the end of the frontier and in acknowledging that the loose structure of frontier institutions and the ability to act on a highly individualistic basis are no longer appropriate today.

In 1500 the European world was corporate to a high degree. Although the individual triumphed in the frontier period, once more today—

Corporateness has extended in every direction, into all forms of business, into the professions through associations, into churches, into amusements, into education. Its influence is today as pervasive in America as the frontier influence was a century ago. Corporateness is now the primary fact and the dominant force in modern life, and whatever men are to have of individualism, they must come at by making terms with a corporate world and not a frontier one. After all, corporations—I use the term broadly—are composed of human beings, and the question is whether they shall serve the individual or be served by him. The new individualism will arrive when corporateness comes to serve society rather than master, crowd and drive it.



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
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Fortunately for this country, the American military man has invariably acted in accordance with Professor Webb's final sentence.

When Sir Charles Darwin considers the future of man for a million years, he does not take that period of time as merely a convenient round number. Geological evidence shows that it takes about a million years to make a new species of animal and that therefore human nature as we know it today must inevitably stay much the same for that length of time. But if human nature is not destined to change much, this is by no means true of the physical environment. The present age, according to Sir Charles, "has had an advantage never likely to be repeated, in that it started at a time when the civilized world had frontiers over which it could expand, and now it has abolished all frontiers by expanding over the whole earth." This statement shows how closely the basic concepts of Professor Webb and Sir Charles Darwin resemble each other. What are the consequences foreseen by Sir Charles?

Sir Charles is not concerned with questions of morals. As a matter of fact, he expects little moral improvement in man in the next million years, although he is fairly confident that man will become more intelligent. He believes we can face the difficult problems of the future with more assurance if we recognize the limitations of human beings and no longer struggle to achieve the impossible. To cite an example in the physical world, he points out that before the laws of thermodynamics were discovered, perpetual motion was thought to be a possibility in the design of machinery. In the physical world we now realize through these laws the limitations inherent in nature. Sir Charles would establish the laws of human thermodynamics, so as to determine the possibilities of the human animal, limited as he is by the laws of heredity. The scientific basis for his conclusions is the operation of the law of large numbers in connection with probabilities. This does not count out frequent and large variations from the normal, such as the present period in history, but the general average can nevertheless be predicted with considerable certainty when hundreds of millions of human beings through the ages to come are taken into consideration.

The author examines the implications of the ultimate end of the coal, oil, and mineral supply, especially the problems resulting from the total consumption of fuel. He emphasizes the pressure of increasing population on the means of subsistence with the certainty of famine for some portion of the world's population in the ages to come. He agrees with Professor Webb that since wealth and its wide distribution are a necessary condition for democracy, the world will see comparatively little democracy in the ages to come. He also thinks that some portion of humanity will probably continue to live in a state of slavery. In short, since we have expended

the accumulated savings of hundreds of millions of years, there is no great future for our present standard of living. A permanent world government may be possible during the rare event of a world-wide Golden Age. But ordinarily political boundaries will still exist in the future to divide the world into a number of provinces.

What of the future of warfare? Apparently he has little faith in universal peace. Therefore, the first question he asks is, "whether the attack or the defense is likely to be the stronger, or, putting it figuratively, whether the cavalry or the infantry is to rule the battlefield." He points out that the superiority of the cavalry caused more than 500 years of barbarism in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. Organized armies and the invention of gunpowder revitalized the infantry, which once more became the dominant arm on the battlefield. He continues:

In very recent times there has been a threat that once again the cavalry, in the form of the tank and the aeroplane, might become superior to the infantry. The danger is by no means over, but the experience of the recent war does suggest, rather contrary to expectations, that the infantry still reigns on the battlefield. However, there is a stronger reason which seems to safeguard the future of civilization from destruction by the cavalry. This is that it calls for a very high pitch of civilization to make a tank or an aeroplane. It is by no means unlikely that at some time or other one of the world's provinces may establish itself as a military autocracy and conquer the rest of the world, but to be successful it would have to be—and stay—at the peak of civilization. So it seems unlikely that, in the future, civilization will be directly destroyed by war, as it was in the Dark Ages.

We do not ordinarily associate the writings of physicists and historians with unlabored fluency of style and the felicitous phrase. Both books are written with unusual clarity and rare charm. Both required a high degree of courage to write, for their conclusions will not be palatable reading for the multitude. But they are unquestionably two of the most valuable contributions to the philosophy of history to appear in recent years.

—BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG.


ANOTHER ENGLISHMAN IS MISSING

STOLEN JOURNEY. By Oliver Philpot. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 448 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.50.

We need a book like this every so often to remind us that the British are wonderful people. This is another of the long series of British books on "How I Escaped from a Prisoner-of-War Camp," and as such is probably destined for a poor sale in the United States, but it brings back to the military reader the incredible belief of the British officer in himself and his country.

Philpot was an airman, shot down into the North Sea and "rescued" by the Germans. His travels from camp to camp, and his detailed explanations of the many

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MILITARY JUSTICE

Under the Uniform Code

by James Snedeker, Brigadier General, USMC, Retired

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THE AUTHOR

James Snedeker has J.D. and S.J.D. degrees from George Washington Law School. He brings to his book a varied and practical experience in the administration of Military Justice in the Navy, including six years in the office of the Judge Advocate General, and he has both taught and written on the subject since retirement.

APRIL, 1953

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escape devices tried by himself and others make gruesome reading, even at this late date. His is probably the first of the books on the subject to offer much information about the extent to which escape "organizations" existed among the British. There were units to forge papers, to "procure" or convert civilian clothing, to distract the attention of the guards, and to perform other duties which would assist those with the courage and intelligence to try to escape. All these activities existed in the camps, right under the noses of the Germans.

Philpot himself escaped by means of the now-famous Wooden Horse trick, which was of course used only once. Several officers designed a wooden gymnasium horse which was carried out to the parade ground each day (with one or two men in it) and carried back each evening (with the men and the dirt they dug each day). The tunnel they dug went under the wire to freedom.

The British officer seems to take his obligation to escape from enemy prisons very seriously; it's a bit of indoctrination that should be added more forcibly to our own teachings. It does hinder the enemy by requiring more of his men for guard purposes.—A.S.

DE TASSIGNY'S STORY

THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FIRST ARMY. Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. The Macmillan Company, 1952. 532 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$9.50.

In many ways this will be a curious book to the American reader because of its intensely personal tone. It is an extension of General de Lattre's personality just as his Army was, and both reveal a man of genius—and of a thousand contradictions.

The task he accomplished with the French First Army might well have crushed a lesser man. He had as a nucleus veteran colonial units which he assembled and trained in North Africa, and a tough, battle-hardened corps from Italy. Nearly all of these troops had been trained in the traditions of the regular service and were led by men who were products of that service. This was the army Marshal de Lattre led into Southern France with conspicuous success.

To it he had to add over a hundred thousand veterans of the Resistance, young men who had learned soldiering in a different school of war and who were not accustomed to the more formal discipline of the conventional military unit. The integration had to be accomplished while some units of the army were actively fighting the enemy. Yet it was accomplished—not without friction—and the army continued to fight magnificently.

Add to this a cumbersome logistical setup, partly through French channels and partly through American channels, and the constant and often conflicting pressures which the Allied command and de Gaulle's government exerted on de Lattre, and you have a troop commander's nightmare.

But de Lattre guided his conduct on two primary loyalties—to his men and to France. For them he fought magnificently, against the Germans, and sometimes against his superiors. He was determined to help bring about the resurgence of French arms and he fought bitterly any move that might curb the effective fighting power of his army, for it and it alone represented the organized armed might of France. He did not always win his fight, but neither Sixth Army Group nor SHAEF were permitted any doubt of his point of view.

Marshal de Lattre had a deep and abiding affection for his men, an affection that illuminates every page of this book. To him, every man was important and he spared neither himself nor his commanders to see that no man was lost needlessly. This book, in fact, is a memorial to them.

Aside from the insight that he has given us into his own character, Marshal de Lattre has written an account that will serve historians well. It is an enormously detailed report on the organization, training and combat operations of the French First Army from the time of its organization for the landings in Southern France to final victory. It is very evidently the result of complete notes de Lattre must have made on the ground, augmented by exhaustive personnel research. We will look far before we find another book by an army commander which gives his decisions at all levels and the reasons for them together with an operational history at the battalion level.

This is particularly important because Marshal de Lattre and General Alexander Patch, commander of the Seventh Army, are both dead. This is, therefore, the only book we are going to get by a major commander in Sixth Army Group, unless General Devers should write his memoirs in the future. We are fortunate that Marshal de Lattre's skill with the pen and his passion for accuracy equal his ability with the sword.

It has long been this reviewer's opinion that the Seventh Army under General Patch and the First French Army under Marshal de Lattre were two of the most dependable and ably led formations of all the Allied armies in Europe. This history does much to provide documentary support of that belief—O.C.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

CHARLOTTE'S WEB. By E. B. White; Pictures by Garth Williams. Harper & Brothers. 184 Pages; \$2.50.

THE CARTOONS OF COBEAN. Selected and Arranged by Saul Steinberg. Harper & Brothers. 138 Pages; \$3.95.

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS, Revised Edition. By Gwendolen M. Carter, John C. Ranney, and John H. Herz. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 924 Pages; Maps and Charts; Index; \$8.00. "A vastly informative and timely study of the present-day governments of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Germany."

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Off-Duty Reading

Two of Many Western German Minds

IT'S a good guess that there are almost as many shades of opinion about the United States among West Europeans as there are West Europeans. Two of these many shades are reflected—though to some extent incidentally—in new books by German authors.

Heinz Schaeffer, the author of *U-Boat 977* (Norton, \$3.50), took his craft from Norwegian waters to the coast of Argentina after Germany's collapse. There he surrendered himself, his U-boat and his crew to Argentine authorities after a cruise that included a stretch of sixty-six days when *U977* was completely submerged. Schaeffer was in World War II all the way, and in submarines most of the time. He is one of the comparatively few survivors of Germany's submarine service. He writes well, and the simple facts of *U977's* operations against Allied shipping should stand for a long time as one of the best and most dramatic accounts of submarine warfare. We must certainly give Schaeffer a high mark as a naval writer. But of equal importance is Schaeffer's self-revelation. Here is a courageous, competent naval officer who performs a feat of seamanship perhaps unequalled in the annals of submarine warfare. And why? Because he felt that in Argentina he and his men would receive the courtesies proper to naval personnel surrendering their ship. The Allies, he felt, had become barbarians and were no longer capable of treating a defeated enemy with the consideration custom demanded.

IN Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, author of *I Joined the Russians* (Yale, \$4.00), we have an entirely different kind of man. Von Einsiedel was a Luftwaffe ace shot down over Stalingrad and taken prisoner by the Russians. When this happened he was twenty-one years old, and immature even for twenty-one. From here we can watch two developments: the Communist operation to split the captured German armies from both Hitler and the West through the Free Germany Committee, and Von Einsiedel's personal conflict as he is forced to choose between two authoritarian governments. This is a remarkable book both in its descriptions of the Russian handling of the German prisoners of war, and in the clarity and evident candor of the author's analysis of his conversion to Communism and his eventual withdrawal from it to a position of wary neutrality. Here, in short, is the development of a man from a boy—a man who embraced Communism because he felt it held some hope of saving Germany from Hitler's madness, worked for it in Germany after the war, and then got out after its excesses exceeded Hitler's own. But in getting out, Von Einsiedel has not run to the West with open arms either. Having been both a Nazi and an active Communist, he would very likely not be given a lavish welcome if he did, but he has misgivings of his own, based partly on what he sees of us and partly on a Hollywood conception of the American "culture."

HERE, then, are two exceptional books, one a vivid narrative of Germany's submarine war effort, the other one of the best personal accounts of the Communist organization of German prisoners of war and of German Communism in print today.

But perhaps more important, both books are singularly revealing of two states of mind among a certain number of Germans. How many Heinz Schaeffers are there who have gone off somewhere to sulk over the "death" of chivalry to the defeated enemy? How many Von Einsiedels have found nothing in the East or the West to sustain them? And of these, how many, like Von Einsiedel, are honestly and painfully trying to come to terms with themselves rather than waiting to see which way the cat jumps?

O.C.S.

FIRESIDE BOOK OF FAVORITE AMERICAN SONGS. Selected and Edited by Margaret Bradford Boni; Arranged for the Piano by Norman Lloyd; Illustrated by Aurelius Battaglia. Simon and Schuster. 360 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. A companion volume to the *Fireside Book of Folk Songs*.

PICTORIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN SPORTS From Colonial Times to the Present. By John Durant and Otto Bettmann. A. S. Barnes & Company. 280 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00.

THE EAST-WEST BOOK OF RICE COOKERY. By Marian Tracy. The Viking Press, Inc. 148 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.95. As food prices go up, rice cookery becomes more popular. This book contains many tasty and exotic recipes.

THE WORLD'S GREATEST BOXING STORIES. Edited, with an introduction by Harold U. Ribalow. Twayne Publishers. 309 Pages; \$2.95.

ATOMIC EXPERIMENTS FOR BOYS. By Raymond F. Yates. Harper & Brothers. 132 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50.

HUNTER. By J. A. Hunter. Harper & Brothers. 263 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50.

GUYS ON ICE. By Lyman R. Ellsworth. David McKay Company, Inc. 277 Pages; \$3.00. Soldiers in the Pribilofs throughout the polar winter.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE. By Kenneth W. Gatland. Philosophical Library. 133 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75.

SIX WAYS TO RETIRE. By Paul W. Boynton. Harper & Brothers. 145 Pages; Index; \$2.50.

A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES. Vol. II, The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East, 1100-1187. By Steven Runciman. Cambridge University Press. 523 Pages; Index; \$7.50.

PARLIAMENTARY LAW FOR THE LAYMAN. By Joseph F. O'Brien. Harper & Brothers. 248 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75.

THE FORGOTTEN REPUBLICS. By Clarence A. Manning. Philosophical Library. 264 Pages; Index; \$2.75. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the rights of small nations.

EAST OF EDEN. By John Steinbeck. The Viking Press, Inc. 602 Pages; \$4.50. Steinbeck's novel which covers the period from the Civil War to World War I.

THE WORLD OF NATURAL HISTORY. By John Richard Saunders. Sheridan House. 321 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. A panorama of the American Museum of Natural History.

THE STORY OF TREES. By Ferdinand C. Lane. Doubleday & Company. 384 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

GHOULIE: Train-Bridge. By Philip M. Wertheimer. Sterling Publishing Co., Inc. 63 Pages; Index; \$1.00.

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
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
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


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TRANSLATED BY O. S. MATTHIJS JOLLES

Military techniques and weapons change with the years, but military principles remain constant. The greatest exponent of the unchanging principles of war in the last century and a quarter has been General Karl von Clausewitz. His great work, *Vom Kriege*, is now available, complete and unabridged, in this first modern translation. With this edition, every officer, every student of war can turn to Clausewitz for instruction, and for interpretation and prediction of the fortunes of war. Here you'll find the unchanging *principles* of attack . . . defense . . . supply . . . grand strategy . . . tactics . . . plans—set forth in surprising detail by the master philosopher of war.

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